Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine
Volume 12

Issue 2

Article 8

2002

The Emergence of the Healthcare Information Trust
Paul T. Kostyack

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul T. Kostyack, The Emergence of the Healthcare Information Trust, 12 Health Matrix 393 (2002)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol12/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

NOTE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE
HEALTHCARE INFORMATION
TRUST
Paul T. Kostyackt
INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION HAS BEEN SAID TO BE the currency
of the modem technological age. 'Our economy is not simply
supplied by information, it is fueled by information." Today,
information has become a secondary product of -almost all
transactions. 2 In fact, massive markets for secondary information are developing.
Today a company exists that gathers, consolidates, sorts,3
and reports information about nearly everyone in the country.
Acxiom Corporation has information concerning over 196 million Americans.4 The organization synthesizes information from
a variety of sources including credit card transactions, real es-

1 The author is graduate of Case Western Reserve University Law School. He
is currently an Associate in the Cleveland office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. He
would like to thank professor Maxwell Mehlman for his assistance in writing this
note. Loving dedication of the note to Stephanie Kostyack for putting up with him
while it was written. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which he is associated.
1 Robert O'Harrow Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal,WASH. PosT, Mar.
8, 1998 at Al (quoting D. Van Skilling, CEO of Experian, a data-clearinghouse/credit
reporting industry giant).
2 See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in PersonalInformation:An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEo. L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996) (discussing the information that is routinely disclosed in voluntary commercial transactions).
3 See Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: Privacy Devalued in Information EconTIMEs, June 12, 1997, at Al.
omy, N.Y.
4
0'Harrow Jr., supra note 1.
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tate records, 5 and 800-number telephone calls 6 for resale to cor-

porations seeking to market to targeted demographics of consumers. The company's sales clearly demonstrate the growing
financial relevance of the market in "secondary data"; 7 Acx-

iom's revenues have increased a staggering amount in seven
years from $91 million in 19928 to nearly $730 million in 1999. 9
Market observers suggest that enterprises will spend over $10
billion dollars in 2000 in building10and maintaining "data warehouses" of secondary information.
The health care market is not without analogous, though
more limited, initiatives. As an example, the Medical Information Bureau (ME) has long compiled information on individuals for risk assessment and fraud avoidance by the insurance
industry. As this Note will discuss, hospitals, health systems,
and managed care health plans are becoming the central players

to utilize the medical information collected on consumers in the
growing secondary information market and to increase
the value
Ix
of health care data as a critical strategic resource.
Health care, however, is an industry holding uniquely
sensitive personal information, and its evolution may chart a
different course than the secondary information markets evolving
in other industries due to recently finalized federal health care
information privacy rules.' 2 Privacy advocates, due to the strong
S5d.

6 See Robert O'Harrow Jr., A Hidden Toll on Free Calls: Lost Privacy,WASH.
POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at Al (discussing the lack of prohibitions on the collection of
telephone information).
7 "Secondary data" in "secondary data markets" is, for the purposes of this
Note, information collected at a primary consumer transaction (e.g., a doctor visit),
which might be used for a purpose not relating to the primary consumer transaction
(e.g., marketing pharmaceutical products).
8

See AcxIoM, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT.

9 See ACXIOM, INc., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 29, available at http://www.acxiom.com/subimages/20042001AnRpt-99-FULL.pdf.
1o O'Harrow Jr., supra note 1.
" See Mariella Savidge, Who's Selling Your Medical Information,THE MORNING CALL (ALLENTOWN), Nov. 7, 1999, at D1 (discussing how the Medical Information Bureau Inc. collects medical information and sells it to insurance companies);
Ray Reed, Organization CompilesMedical Info, ROANOKE TiMEs, Jun. 9, 1998, at C1
(same); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of PersonalHealth
Care Information, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1997) (noting that "[tihe practice of medicine increasingly depends on the large-scale comparison and analysis of personal
medical information. As a result, health care institutions view personal medical information as a critical strategic resource").
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countervailing value of medical information confidentiality,
have convinced the federal government to adopt a form of "default privacy rules" 13 whereby explicit written "authorizations"
will be required for health care providers, health plans, and data
clearinghouses to use gathered medical information from health
care purchasers for purposes other than care provision, claims
payment, regulatory reporting, and research. 14 These regulatory
initiatives will frustrate the emergence of a fully dynamic secondary market in medical information. They might, however,
provide individuals with the ability to benefit from value inherent in the use of secondary health care data through a new organization, the Healthcare Information Trust.
This Note presents the concept of the Healthcare Information Trust and the reasons why it may be a preferable alternative
to other organizations in managing secondary health care information. The Healthcare Information Trust is an organization
with the fiduciary obligation to manage an individual's secondary health care information for the advantage of the individual
as beneficiary. The Healthcare Information Trust may be the
only organization that could maximize the value of secondary
health care information to the individual and to a developing
secondary health care information market.
This Note is divided into four parts. The first three parts lay
the practical and legal groundwork for the emergence of the
Healthcare Information Trust. In part one, the emergence of "integrated delivery systems" and "managed care organizations" as
the developing focal points of health care information consolidation is discussed. The second part presents a simplified
framework useful in understanding the nature of the threats and

12See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
45 C.F.R. § 164 (2000).
13See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 54-58 (discussing theoretical distinction
between default and mandatory rules for information disclosure or privacy); see also
Murphy, supra note 2, at 2383 (posing "the fundamental question [as] whether a rule
permitting subsequent disclosure is superior, as a default rule, to a rule requiring
privacy"); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 521-26 (1995) (discussing concept of individual default ownership and control
of the full longitudinal medical record used for any secondary purpose with noninformed consent use exceptions only in limited instances by health information

"trustees").

14 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (regulating authorization for use of health information for secondary purposes by a covered entity).
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opportunities inherent in the secondary use of health care in-

formation. This section also explores the economics of health
care information, raising the possible implications of "default
privacy rules" on the emergence of a dynamic "secondary
health care information" market. The third part discusses the
agency and market barriers to individual managed care organizations or integrated delivery systems, or their collaborative industry groups, emerging as the organizers of an individual's
"longitudinal medical record." Finally, part four describes the
conception of the Healthcare Information Trust as the organizer
of the "longitudinal medical record," its promises and the major
barriers to its possible creation.

PART I: TECHNOLOGY, MCOs, AND IDSs
The health care industry is, arguably, on the cusp of
technological capacity to realize the Healthcare Information
Trust envisioned in this Note. Wide-scale consolidation and
integration of information is occurring in the health care
industry; these advances are occurring prominently in evolving
"integrated
delivery
systems"
and
"managed
care
organizations. 15 These efforts, coupled with the increasing
consolidation of the integrated delivery systems and managed

care organizations within individual health care markets, may
become viable
primary sources of regional health care data
16
repositories.

Further, the Internet has become a ubiquitous technology
that will emerge as the vehicle for disseminating the "longitudinal medical records" 17 providing new value to patients and pro1SThis Note uses a number of acronyms for health care terms. A definition of
"integrated delivery systems" or "IDSs" as used in this Note can be found, infra, at
Part I.A. A definition of "managed care organizations" or "MCOs" as used in this
Note can be found, infra, at Part I.A.
16 A definition and discussion of "clinical data repositories" or "CDRs" and
related "data warehouses" or "warehouses" begins, infra,at Part I.B.
17 A longitudinal medical record is the health care record of an individual
containing all medical and transactional data concerning an individual across all episodes of care and across all health care providers, insurers or administrators, governmental agencies or other individuals or entities maintaining health care information
identifiable to the individual concerned. At present, of course, such a concept is theoretical, or an aspiration, since no such wide-scale comprehensive record system exists
today. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 458 (calling it a "patient-based longitudinal
health record"); see also INST. OF MED., NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIENCES, HEALTH DATA IN
THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DIscLOSURE, AND PRIVACY 5 (1994) (discussing comprehensiveness and inclusiveness of databases); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (describing 'longitudinal oriented lifetime patient summaries').
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viders. In other words, the Internet will soon become the backbone of longitudinal medical records, at least initially in readonly form, for individuals, providers and other health care information users. It will do this by providing a vehicle for making consolidated information available to anyone with an Internet connection, a standard browser application, and the proper
security.
This section presents an overview of integrated delivery
systems and managed care organizations as the primary organizers of health care data and a simplified discussion of the current structure and use of technology in the health care industry
that facilitate the development of the Healthcare Information
Trust.
A. Emergence of IDSs and MCOs
In 1994 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a study
presenting observations and recommendations about "health
database organizations" (HDOs). 18 HDOs referred to a variety
of entities having access to or control of aggregate and individually identifiable medical data to be used for public release
and public analysis.1 9 At that time, the IOM recognized that true
HDOs did not exist, although they would be emerging in the
near future. 20 The IOM further recognized that HDOs would not
be organizers of "primary medical records," nor were they "intended to be the major source of information about specific patients for the treating physician," but would be compilations of
data for "secondary" uses.21
The IOM report also discussed at length the potential problems with HDOs, including making recommendations for their
structure and regulation. 22 The report left much unsaid, however, about how widespread HDOs would become, their relationship to the primary consolidators of health care records, and
particularly, the barriers to realizing truly "comprehensive" and

18 See INST. OF MED., supra note 17.
19

Id. at3.

20 id.
21 Id. at 5; see also, Gostin, supra note

nition for
22 "secondary" health care data uses).

13, at 486 (providing a workable defi-

See INST. OF MED., supra note 17, at 1-26 (providing an executive summary

of HDO issues and recommendations).
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"inclusive" data sets across individuals and populations. 23 Citing specialized efforts to create HDOs with varying degrees of
"comprehensive" and "inclusive" data sets, 24 the report assumed

that significant HDOs would emerge in the future.
The IOM's concerns and recommendations pertaining to
HDOs are well founded and are very real considerations today.
This Note, however, questions whether truly "comprehensive"
and "inclusive" HDOs will emerge for the benefit of the public.
Further, as will be discussed in Part III, this Note questions
whether the existing organizations emerging as the focal collec-

tors of health care data would be capable, absent some external
regulatory or market pressure, of divulging their information or
creating meaningful analysis for public consumption.
Today, most health care information is still held in "islands
of data" throughout the extremely loose federation of health

care providers and insurers; detailed medical information still
primarily resides with individual providers (e.g., physician offices, laboratories, hospitals, pharmacies), employers, and
health plans. 25 One need only observe first, the number of indi-

23 See id. at 40-90 (lacking in-depth discussion of how HDOs will emerge and
resistance to sharing data by provider and insurance organizations that might be primary collectors). "Comprehensiveness" means the data collected for individuals
across different provider locations, and over time across episodes of care. Id. at 5.
"Inclusiveness" means data collected across a variety of populations of individuals
and across geographies). Id.
24 See id. at 56-60 (citing a variety of developing HDOs in 1994).
25 Gostin reports that:
The General Accounting Office estimates that the 34 million annual hospital admissions and 1.2 billion physician visits could generate the equivalent
of 10 billion pages of medical records.... Information about a single episode of care could reside in the records of several different providers ....
Further, there are no systematic operational models for the electronic storage of all aspects of health records.
Gostin, supra note 13, at 457 (citations omitted); see also William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 1701, 1723 (discussing the difficulties of compiling data from individual
providers, the author notes that the "universe of potentially regulated parties below
the level of the health plan is daunting"); RICHARD BRETAGNE ET AL., LEADING THE
WAY TO HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE ELECTRONIC WORLD (1999),
http:llwww.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9fd
/ (noting that "each individual has dozens of contacts with the health care system
through various employers, many episodes of care, and multiple health plans, resulting in point-of-service 'islands' of patient information"); Lisa L. Dahm, Using the
DNA Profile as the Unique PatientIdentifier in the Community Health Information
Network. Legal Implications, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 227, 230
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vidual physicians and health systems, and second, their largely
insular26 relationships to understand the magnitude of the challenge.
Nonetheless, several market trends point to the emergence
of larger "islands of information." These include the consolidation of hospitals and other providers into "integrated delivery
systems," (IDSs) and the emergence of "managed care organizations," (MCOs). Both of these organizations are collecting and
consolidating far greater amounts of computerized medical information than ever before. These entities, arguably, emerge as

the primary source and initial organizers of digitalized health
information.
The 1990s have witnessed the rapid horizontal and vertical
consolidation of hospitals, physicians, and other ancillary providers (e.g., skilled nursing homes, nursing homes, home health
agencies, durable medical equipment providers) into IDSs. 27
Component parts of an IDS financially and legally incorporated,
and integrated into one health system enterprise, may be far
28
looser confederations of networks, or may be a combination.
Due to the variety of structures that these entities assume, conventional wisdom observes that if you have seen one IDS, then
you have seen one IDS.29 Nonetheless, these entities are similar

(1997) (noting that health care providers encounter information that is only partially
or totally inaccessible due to disparate information systems).
6 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1723 (noting that the Joint Commission for
Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO) accredits 18,000 hospitals nationally, and there are over 500,000 physicians currently practicing in the United States);
Dean C. Coddington et al., Providing Capitalfor Physician Group Practices:New
Opportunitiesfor Hospitals, HEALTHcARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1999, at 44 (noting that
"of the more than 500,000 physicians in private practice in the United States, 75 percent are in solo practices or [small] single-specialty groups").
27 See Edwin Fonner, Jr., Milestones For Developing Integrated Delivery
Systems, J. OF HEALTH CARE FIN., Fall 1996, at 1 (discussing horizontal consolidation
of hospitals, emergence of for-profit hospital systems, and physician group practice
growth and the resulting development of vertically integrated IDSs); Robert Jantzen
& Patricia R. Loubeau, Risk-Sharing Integration Efforts in the Hospital Sector,
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Mar. 22, 1999, at 83 (discussing the IDS as the "emerging organizational
model" of healthcare delivery).
28
See Martin P. Charns, OrganizationDesign of IntegratedDelivery Systems,
42 HosP. & HEALTH SERv. -ADMIN. 411, 411 (1997) (discussing the theoretical
evolution of IDSs through stages of horizontal and vertical integration).
29 See Integration Strategies in Transition: An Interview with Russell C.
Coile, Jr., HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2000, at 37 [hereinafter Integration
Strategies] (quoting industry expert recognizing that "the implicit concept of the IDS
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in that they are all forging greater financial, operational, and
clinical linkages among the disparate providers of health care in
the face of the growth
of managed care and increasingly
30
markets.
competitive
Medical information sharing is essential to the provision of
3
clinical care and administering a complex health care system. '
IDSs have recognized the need for, and have begun to invest
substantial capital in, integrating information systems to provide, at least theoretically, a seamless delivery of care-access
to medical and health care32 administration information for providers throughout the IDS.
MCOs also emerged as the second market player effectively consolidating vast amounts of individually identifiable
health care information. An MCO, for the purposes of this Note,
is a prepaid health care delivery organization that provides
managed care insurance products, which can take a variety of
forms. These organizations and products would include HMOs,
preferred provider organizations, exclusive provider organizations, 33point-of-service plans, and physician-sponsored organizations. This definition would include entities such as all models
of HMOs, Blue-Cross/Blue-Shield plans now utilizing managed
care insurance products, and other insurers, self-funded employers, and provider-organized networks insofar as they utilize
(or subcontract for) managed care functionality and offer insurance products directly or through other organizations.

will continue, but we probably will refer to them simply as systems with a small s
because30they will have such a variety of structures").
See, e.g., Jantzen & Loubeau , supra note 27, at 84 (finding that the major
factors driving greater alignment among providers has been the growth of managed
care and intensity of local competition).
31See Gostin, supra note 13, at 453.
32 See Thomas M. McNamara, Health Information Networks: Enabling Care
Management in IDSs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 2000, at 30 (discussing the
necessity of IDSs to integrate information systems to share managed care, cost and
clinical information); Gwen Mousin et al., IT Integration Optionsfor IntegratedDelivery Systems, HEALTHCARE FiN. MGMT., Feb., 1999, at 53 (discussing the substantial capital investment required in integration, although challenging the certainty of
"cost savings" through integration).
33For a more detailed description of these types of products/organizations,
see Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the Crossroads:
Can Managed Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 25, 27-29 (1998).
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Although MCOs have a long history in the United States,
beginning with Kaiser Permanente plans in the 1930s,3 4 it has
not been until the last three decades that they have emerged in
greater numbers and permutations.35 By the 1990s, however,
through growth and rapid market consolidation, they and their
insurance products have become ubiquitous and formidable
shapers of the competitive dynamic of the entire health care industry. 6
Like IDSs, MCOs have realized the need for substantial information in order to manage the care of individuals and populations.3 7 Many MCOs have expanded their data system capabilities beyond the basic claims processing functionality of indemnity insurers.3 8 Substantial numbers of MCOs track and report data concerning cost and utilization, member satisfaction,
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Sets (HEDIS) (or
other care-quality report cards), specific disease incidence,
population health, mortality rates, and health changes by condition. 9 MCOs also track data to support important clinical and
administrative functionality, such as capitation rate analysis,
provider credentialing, physician profiling, diagnostic episode
analysis, and illness severity adjustments.4 ° Critically important
34 For information about the history of Kaiser Permanente, see KAISER PERYEARS OF QuALrrY, at http://www.kaiserpermanente.org/newsroom/history.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2000).
MANENTE, HISTORY: MORE THAN 50

35 For information on the growth of HMOs from the 1970s to the mid-1990s,
see INTERSTuDY, THE INTERSTuDY HMO TREND REPORT, 1978-1997 (1998); Brown
& Hartung, supra note 33, at 26-27.
36 See Grant T. Savage et al., Beyond Managed Costs, HEALTH CARE MGMT.
REV., Winter 2000, at 93 (finding that although MCOs face an uncertain future if they
continue to merely manage costs today, they will "dominate the national market for
employer-based health care" through rapid consolidation, increasing market share of
specific MCOs).
37 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1726 (discussing the role of MCOs in consolidating provider data and the benefits and limitations of using MCOs for information
disclosure); see also Arnold M. Epstein, Rolling Down the Runway: The Challenges
Ahead for Quality Report Cards, 279 JAMA 1691, 1694-95 (1998) (discussing how
increased information to consumers will help develop quality indicators).
38 See Douglas R. Wholey et al., The Diffusion of Information Technology
Among Health Maintenance Organizations,25 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv., Spring
2000, at 24 (reporting results of the information technology capabilities of 588
HMOs).
39 See id. at 29. For a description of HEDIS, see NAT'S CoMM. FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, THE HEALTH PLAN EMPLoYER DATA AND INFORMATION SET (HEDIS),
http://www.ncqa.org/Pages/Programs/HEDIS/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2000).
40 Wholey et al., supra note 38, at 26.
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for the purposes of this Note, a large percentage of MCOs,
sixty-eight percent, utilize or are creating "data warehouses"
supporting managerial and clinical decision-support systems.41
B. Creation of Clinical Data Repositories and Data Warehouses
Perhaps the most promising efforts by IDSs and MCOs today to organize and use the disparate pockets of information in
their delivery system is the creation of clinical data repositories
(CDRs) and data warehouses. CDRs and data warehouses integrate "numerous 'islands of information' . . . to allow users ac-

cess [to enterprise-wide information] in a timely, effective
manner... even if the [existing hospital's] operational systems
are not standardized onto one [information system] platform or
one physical device." 42 A CDR is typically oriented toward "patient-centered information" which can be updated in a real-time
environment and organized so as to allow multiple access points
and quick retrieval of information to support treatment decisions.43 A CDR will contain individually identifiable health care
data containing "patient demographics, lab results, scheduling
information, medical record data, and images such as x-rays."
The amount invested in clinical data repositories by health care
providers has been substantial. 45
Data warehouses are also being developed by IDSs as well
as MCOs. 46 Data warehouses may also contain individually
identifiable health care information, though they are primarily
oriented toward "aggregate views of the clinical, operational,
and financial performance of the enterprise," in order to support, in a timely manner, reports supporting "administrative,
managerial and executive decision-making." 47 Although less
41id.
42 STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATION: THEORY

INTO PRACTICE 16 (Marion J.Ball et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter STRATEGIES AND
TECHNOLOGIES].
43 See id.

44Id.
45 See John Morrissey, Integration Sacrificed For Y2K Preparation, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 3, 1999, at 34. ("Sales of clinical repository systems surpassed $1
billion for the first time in 1998, 43% more than sales in 1997 and 140% more than
the $459 million recorded for 1996.... In 1998, for example, the projection of $631
million in sales was eclipsed by actual sales of $1.1 billion. And in 1997, a projected
volume of $541 million was outpaced by the actual total of $773 million.").
46 See STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 42, at 24-31.
47 Id. at 17.
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focused on individual patient or MCO enrollee data, these systems can support decisionmaking for population-oriented activities. MCOs have been able to use these data warehouses to facilitate management and clinical decision support and to more
efficiently and accurately produce mandated reports for governmental agencies, employers, the National Committee for
Quality Assurance (NCQA), and others, such as HEDIS.48
C. The Internet Revolution and Individual Access to Medical
Records
Not only are CDRs and data warehouses emerging in
MCOs and IDSs as consolidators of health care information, but
rapid developments in computer networking are also occurring.
Internet access is quickly becoming a ubiquitous feature in most
industries, and is becoming available to wider segments of the
individual population. 49 This development has important implications for the sharing of digitalized medical records not only
within IDSs, but with patients and other users of medical records. The eagerness of Americans to use the Internet for medical information is well documented.50
The standardization of Internet and browser technology can
dramatically reduce the costs and difficulties of patients, and
their health care agents, to access health care information about
them.5 ' If the Internet is used as a vehicle to disseminate certain
information, as will be discussed below, it eliminates the costs
of installing and maintaining remote software applications,
which are specific to the software applications used by the

48 See id.; see also Wholey et al., supra note 38, at 28-29 (discussing services
provided by information technology). Information about NCQA can be found at
http://www.ncqa.org/index.htm.
49 About 44.4 million households will be online by the end of 2000, up from
12.7 million in 1995, an increase of nearly 250 percent over five years; roughly 55
million Americans log onto the Internet on a typical day to send or read e-mail, get
news and information or conduct business; and industry experts estimate that traffic
on the Internet doubles every 100 days. Richard Drezen, A Dot-Corn World, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2000, at G1; see also Jill Young Miller, The Web Grows Up, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 14, 2000, at DI (finding a dramatic increase in use of the
Internet by women).
50 Ninety-eight million Americans use the Internet each year to look for health
information, which is up 44 million in the last two years. Edie Kasten, Let the Surfer
Beware: Use Health Information Found on Internet Wisely, CHCAGO TRIB., Nov. 5,
2000, at C8 (citing an August 2000 Harris Poll).
51 See STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 42, at 32.
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holder of the health care data.52 Further, the use of an Internet
browser to access health care information requires no additional
training and expertise-that is, the training and expertise required to visit a web site such as "Yahoo" would translate to the
ability to review medical records. 53 Finally, as demonstrated by
the example below, software can be developed to access, integrate, and present information already stored in CDRs and data
warehouses. Similar software can be integrated into an existing
information infrastructure, minimizing additional data integration and compilation requirements.54
This technology is already being used successfully by
IDSs. The University of Virginia's early experimentation with
the Internet in its Virtual Electronic Medical Record (VEMR)
system is good example. 55 The University of Virginia used what
it calls a Medical Records Generator (MRG) to organize various
sources of information throughout its health care enterprise, creating a multi-layered, though non-dynamic, hyper-text markup
language record of individual patient information including inpatient/outpatient financial account status, laboratory results,
patient scheduling, patient demographics, radiological images,
inpatient medications, insurance coverage, and discharge summaries.56 Some of the information was compiled through a
document management system that scanned documents in order
to allow the end-user access to imaged information ranging
from x-rays to a copy of the patient's insurance card.57 However, most of the information was complied from existing health
care information systems.
The University of Virginia experience is demonstrative of
the existing capability of the Internet to revolutionize information access to medical record data. Although the information in
the University of Virginia's VEMR was non-dynamic, readonly records, web technology is quickly becoming integrated
into commercial information system products,59 which will allow, in the near future, the ability to update information through
52 See id. at 24.

51 See id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
55 See id. at 37.
56 see id.

-7 See id. at 36-37.
51 See id. at 40.
59 See id.
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a browser. Finally, the University of Virginia VEMR project
cost the enterprise $1.7 million over five years starting in
1993.60 Although the authors caution that different organizations will have different financial requirements, 6 1 this level of
capitalization would not be an insurmountable barrier to many
larger health care organizations. Moreover, it is a cost that may
decrease in the future, given the greater incorporation of Internet features in primary health care information system products
today, 62including tools which access CDRs and data warehouses
The VEMR experience demonstrates that the use of the
Internet can make information available to anyone with appropriate clearance, an Internet connection, and the ability to review medical information. In this respect, it is revolutionary, as
it decreases the transaction costs to such a degree that anyone,
including individuals and providers, can access and use digitalized medical records.
This section has demonstrated two of the three elements
necessary for the emergence of a Healthcare Information Trust.
First, the consolidation of greater islands of digitalized data in
CDRs and data warehouses occurring today in IDSs and MCOs
provides a starting, primary record source for comprehensive
digitalized medical records-at least for records within individual IDSs and MCOs. Second, the Internet provides a feasible
information network in order to practically and economically
share digitized medical records from individual to consumers,
their providers, and other third parties. The next section describes the emergence of a third requirement-the creation of a
market for individually identifiable health care data where the
individual is more than a passive participant.
PART I[: LAW-ECONOMIC PROSPECTIVE ON
HEALTHCARE DATA AND PRIVACY
To understand the role of the hypothetical Healthcare Information Trust, it is critical to understand the economics of
medical health care information within the ongoing medical re6

See id.

61 See

id. The current VEMR system allows users the ability to view medical
record information. At this time, however, it does not allow the user to use the Internet browser to update information. In this sense, it is "non-dynamic" and "readonly." 62See id. at 21-23.

HEALTH MATRIX

(Vol. 12:393

cords privacy debate. First, a theoretical framework for using
individually identifiable health care information for both "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" purposes will be set forth. Second,
the economics of voluntarily divulged information will be described. Third, an observation of how this model has been applied to justify the creation of "default privacy rules" in health
care information will be presented. This discussion will provide
an understanding of the impact that the current proposed Stan-

dards for Privacy may have on medical information contained
in IDSs and MCOs; further, it will lay the basis for understanding why the existing health care market fails to provide an efficient secondary market for health care information that provides
both individual and collective benefit.
A. Inclusionary/Exclusionary Framework
In discussing data collected about individuals, it is useful to
distinguish between "primary healthcare data" use and "secondary healthcare data" use. This Note addresses the latter of the

two. In Gostin's framework, "primary healthcare data" is used
directly for the medical care of the individual, patient management, and financial reimbursement. 63 This is the direct use of
information provided by the patient, and created by the health
care provider, during the episode of care. Its use directly in the
provision of and payment of care is, arguably, 64 implied in the
contractual
relationship between the patient and health care pro65
vider.

63 Gostin, supra note 13, at 486 (describing "primary justification" uses and
"secondary uses").
64 See id. at 486-87 (arguing against blanket assumptions about data disclosure without consent and need for compelling justification for non-consent releases).
65See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2387, 2402 (recognizing that information in
commercial transactions is property and the right to the information "is a question of
contract, either explicit contract, or... implied contract"). Murphy also recognizes
that the analogous implied privacy standard between attorney-client and physicianpatient, although ethical in origin, is "at bottom... a rule of contract." Id. at 2408-10;
see also Sage, supra note 25, at 1746-52 (discussing agency-related disclosure obligations"); Gostin, supra note 13, at 508-09 (recognizing that an action for misuse of
patient information by a physician can be based upon, among other theories, that of
implied contract). A Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) drafting committee is discussing a revision of the Code to include implied warranties in information exchange.
Resembling the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existing in contracts for sale of tangible goods, the UCC may establish a national standard for information exchange. Kristin B. Keltner, Networked Health Information: Assuring
Quality Control on the Internet,50 FED. COMM. L.J. 417, 435-36 (1998).
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"Secondary healthcare data" is the use of primary healthcare data for numerous ancillary purposes including, but not
limited to, disclosures for education, regulatory purposes, commercial uses, research, and public health.66 The comprehensive
information enclosed in secondary healthcare data is very similar to that contained in what some would term "longitudinal
medical records." 67 This would encompass every record about a
person's health and care provision over all providers, all times,
68
places, insurance coverage, or care delivery organizations.
The promise of secondary uses of "semi-public" 69 digitized
medical records, however, is not without serious threat to individuals. This is primarily through the potential for secondary
uses of data to the detriment of individuals. Many authors have
forcefully cautioned about the palpable effects on the individual
of the digitalization and the inclusion of medical records within
health care organizations, governmental agencies, and within
any form of broader national electronic health care information
infrastructure. 70 The wide-scale digitalization, consolidation,
sharing, and data-linkages not only exacerbate existing threats
to individuals, but raises a wealth of new issues pertaining to
appropriate use of information. Gostin and Schwartz note that
these fears are real, given the lack of virtually any federal restraints on secondary uses of the vast majority of individually
identifiable medical information, 71 the ad-hoc nature of state
legislation,72 and the limited scope and constraining power of
66 Gostin outlines a number of uses for information tracked in currently existing "population-wide health databases," including uses considered in this Note as
"secondary healthcare data." Gostin, supra note 13, at 467
67

See id. at 458 (calling it "patient-based longitudinal health records"); see

also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (describing 'longitudinal oriented lifetime patient

summaries').
6 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (describing how with the use of online
record management, one click of a mouse button can allow physicians to view a patient's comprehensive medical record).
69 See id. (describing the semi-public nature of on-line medical records).
70 See generally Gostin, supra note 13 (providing, arguably, one of the most

authoritative discussions of medical record privacy risks).
71 See id. at 494-506 (1995); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 46 (explaining how
the United States lacks any regulation prohibiting certain uses of health care information); see also Sheri Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy,
and Health Care Reform, HASTINGS CR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 13, 13 (noting
commonly cited fact that video rentals have greater federal protection than do medi-

cal records).

72 Gostin, supra note 13, at 506-08 (discussing state privacy legislation, in-*
cluding the "patient-provider privilege" and "disease-specific" statutes).
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common law remedies for breaches of confidentiality (or other,
similar tort actions), particularly after data is shared by the initial care
provider for what may be, initially, legitimate pur73
poses.
The use of personally identifiable data as a market commodity has a nexus with the propensity of organizations to
minimize uncertainty.7 4 That is, absent economic, regulatory,

liability, or contractual restraints, organizations will "greedily.
scan and store as much information as possible" in order to
identify and, if possible, eliminate risk.7 5 The stakes are high;
effective use of information, particularly in markets such as insurance, can mean profit-sharer returns or insolvency. 76 Information that can better identify "most-profitable" customers may
be used to target those consumers, providing a significant competitive advantage.7 7 Moreover, decreased transactional costs of

compiling and analyzing data through the use of computers, and
the increasing availability of individually identifiable information, is substantially lowering the economic barriers for such
have come to speak of this
data use. 78 As Whitaker notes, many
79
as a contemporary "risk society.

73See id. at 508-11 (discussing common-law protection of health informational privacy).
74See REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS
BECOMING
75 A REALITY 2-3 (1999).

1d. at 45.
76 See John V. Jacobi, Canaries in the Coal Mine: The Chronically Ill in
Managed Care, 9 HEALTH MATRIx 79, 93 (1999) (stating that "because the risk assumed under modem, largely managed care-based health insurance is larger than ever
...the incentives to pick and choose among potential insureds may be higher. [There
is a strong incentive] to eschew risk selection"); see also, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-69 (1986)
(explaining the intricacies of risk assessment in insurance law); see generally, DON
PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS
ONE CUSTOMER AT A TIME 123-124 (1993) (arguing that some customers have low or

negative value and might be eliminated from sales efforts or product access).
77See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 18, 95-97, 107-13 (arguing that
information can assist organizations differentiate customers in order to gain increasing "share of customer").
78Schwartz, supra note 11, at 23. Although the authors of The One to One
Future suggest that the cost of "communication" and "information" will be zero, the
dramatic decrease in, at least, the transactional cost of data collection, analysis and
use is an underlying assumption of their vision of the "1:1" future. PEPPERS &
ROGERS, supra note 76, at 6, 7, 24 (recognizing the decreasing costs of information
fold" every twenty years).
processing
79 asserting that these costs reduce "a thousand
WHITAKER, supra note 74, at 44.
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The compilation of such data, coupled with the powerful
incentives to use it, provide the ability to "exclude" individuals
from a wide range of commercial goods (e.g., in our contexts,
insurance, healthcare). Employers may utilize secondaryinformation from other sources to evaluate an application for
employment and mortgage companies and other lenders already
utilize information from credit reporting agencies. in the health
care context, health information is compiled by companies, such
as the Medical Information Bureau, to help insurers identify actuarial risks based upon80 previously submitted enrollment
applications of individuals.
Such exclusions based upon the use of secondary information raise a number of fundamental ethical issues: respect of
human autonomy, respect for selfhood and person, and disruption of important intimate relationships. 81 They also raise significant utilitarian consequences such as disrupting the benefits
of primary information disclosure for the provision of services
(e.g., in our context, physician-patient services) by making participants less likely to share important information, and the
positive externalities of full disclosure for collectively beneficial secondary uses of information (e.g., in our context, public
health reporting).82
Putting a discussion of the negative affects of "exclusionary" uses of information aside for the time being, secondary information is also used for "inclusionary" activities. Inclusionary
activities provide the opportunity to offer more highly customized and more selectively targeted consumer goods than ever
before. 83 Perhaps the Internet is an emerging example of development in this area. By providing personal information to a web
site, the web sites can "identify" the individual through "cookgo See Savidge, supra note 11 (discussing how MIB collects and sells information from insurance applicants); Reed, supra note 11 (same).
81See Gostin, supra note 13, at 513-15 (discussing ethical justifications for
health information infrastructure).
82
Id. at 511.
83 See generally, PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 267-308 (discussing
the concept of targeting customers, not merely niche products and catering to an organization's individualized understanding, through consumer data, of consumer
needs); SETH GODIN, PERMISSION MARKETING: TURNING STRANGERS INTO FRIENDS,

AND FRIENDS INTO CUSTOMERS 24-39, 60-69 (1999) (arguing that "permission marketing" will supplement interruption-based "mass marketing" and firms will develop
greater dialogue with consumers, learning more about them, so that consumers trust
firms and firms can education and tailor products to "their" consumers).
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ies" and provide content that the individual desires, such as specialized news and consumer goods.84 Just as likely, the web site
will use this information to present advertisements targeted to
the individual's
profile, which may be annoying or an outright
85
intrusion.
In the health care context, use of secondary information for
"inclusionary" activities is already occurring. For example,
mailing efforts by MCOs, physician groups, or public health
agencies may be used to encourage mammography testing, prenatal check-up visits, sigmoidoscopy screening, immunizations,
and other services which will benefit populations. These efforts
compile information about populations, select individuals based
upon demographic information, and use a variety of tools
to en86
courage them to seek the health care service suggested.

84In the health care context, "cookies" are used by health-related sites. A
survey by California HealthCare Foundation found that eighteen of twenty-one
health-related web-sites it reviewed use "cookies." JANLORI GOLDMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., REPORT ON THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF

HEALTH WEB S=rES 25 (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/
ihealth/privacywebreport.pdf. These enable the Web site to create a data profile of
that user as the user visits the web-site over time. "[Miost Web sites require users to
forgo privacy in order to take advantage of the services being offered." Id. at 15; see
also GODIN, supra note 83, at 133-34 (describing a company called Imgis that uses
cookies to track user data across multiple web sites in order to provide "customized"
banner ads).
85See Bob Cook, Identity Crisis: PersonalInformation Is PriceDocs Payfor
Free Online Services, MOD. PHYS., July 1, 1999, at 44 (noting that the "free" products and information offered by web-sites to physicians are paid for by information
that the physician offers explicitly and through the use of "cookies" and allows "advertisers to choose [which physicians] sees their advertisements" on the web-site);
see also Janet Gemignani, Who Sees Web Surfers' Health Concerns?, Bus. &
HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2000, at 9 (noting use of cookies and banner ads to track patient
information on health related web-sites has lead to privacy violations where nineteen
of the twenty-one most trafficked health related web-sites violated their own privacy
rules).
86 For an example of such a program, see M. Renneker & H. Saner, Low-Cost
Flexible Sigmoidoscopy Screening: A Community Demonstration And Education
Project, 10 J. CANCER EDUC. 25 (1995); see also Anita J. Slomski, Luring Patients
in for Preventive Care, MED. ECON., Dec. 22, 1997, at 51 (discussing computerized
prevention tracking system where patients are sent reminders to receive preventative
screens). Disease management programs are analogous, though more intensive, examples of how the use of specific healthcare information can improve population
health by targeting individuals in specific disease states. See Billie Heister Waldo,
Disease Management Gains Acceptance-and Finds Its Legs-With Automation, 18
NuRS. ECON., 208, 208 (2000) (discussing the use of "evidence-based medicine and
outcome data to improve the health of populations").
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Inclusionary efforts raise the same ethical and utilitarian
concerns as "exclusionary" activities, if only less acutely. First,
although ostensibly designed to provide the individual with a
consumer option, they often use information without consumer
awareness or permission. These efforts may be more about increasing services (and revenues) and less about population
health. For example, efforts by pharmaceutical providers to encourage prescription refills have recently been attacked.87 They
therefore raise the same ethical issues regarding individual
autonomy as exclusionary uses. Second, it is often impossible to
differentiate truly "beneficial" information from the avalanche
of "interruption" 88 marketing.
In short, "inclusionary" activities may also be problematic.
Their value to the individual depends upon the utility they provide the individual and the individual's desire to be communicated with. Indeed, in the case of inclusionary efforts, individuals may still be reluctant to disclose information about themselves for fear of unwanted communication.
It is also critical to note that information for "exclusionary"
purposes can also empower consumers. For example, forcing
MCOs to provide "report cards," HEDIS report, and other quality-oriented studies is an exclusionary use of data oriented toward consumer choice. Individuals, or their expert purchasing
agents (e.g., employers offering healthcare coverage) may use
this information to differentiate insurers based upon quality,
cost, or other measures. This also extends to efforts such as reporting of cost information and outcomes by hospitals, actions
against individual physicians by Medical Boards, or physician
profiles by health plans. Ostensibly, by providing these indicators, which may be required by governmental agencies or larger
purchasers, consumers or their agents are better able to make
choices about health care financing and delivery. In other
words, individuals directly, or through their expert agents, can
minimize their own risk and exclude plans and providers that
measure less favorably.
From here on, exclusionary uses will be divided into two
categories. Exclusionary uses by entities to deny individuals
87 See, e.g., Michael Slezak, Chains Rethink Compliance After Patient Up-

roar:Refill Reminders May Require Patient Consent, AM. DRUGGIST, May 1998, at
10 (describing the controversy arising from pharmacies giving the names of customers to an88outside firm, which sent prescription reminders to patients).
See GODIN, supra note 83, at 24-29.
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consumer benefits will be termed "first-order exclusionary
uses." Exclusionary benefits to benefit consumer decisionmaking in order to exclude organizations providing lesser benefit
will be termed "second-order exclusionary uses."
The inclusionary/exclusionary framework is important for
our purposes because it is a simplified framework that will be
used later to highlight the deficiencies of the current health care
information market and the benefits of the Healthcare Information Trust. Specifically, it will be used to highlight the current
market's inability, in the face of default privacy rules, to optimize the value of secondary use health care data (particularly
for individuals) as well as the advantages of the Healthcare Information Trust in realizing this value.
B. Economics of Medical Records and Default Rules
Information is, arguably, the principal product purchased
by patients when consulting health care providers; "information
..is precisely what is being bought from most physicians, and,

indeed, from most professionals." 89 This information not only
has a primary value to consumers as part of the bundle of goods
and services purchased during an episode of care, but, as has
been discussed, has a substantial secondary value. Two markets
are quickly emerging in most consumer transactions today: first,
the value of the initial products and services; second, and sometimes just as importantly, the secondary value created in the information concerning the transaction.90 As both Murphy and
Schwartz point out, at issue is who, in a voluntary contractual
setting, should be the default owner of the secondary usage of
the information. That is, should a default privacy rule (patient
owner) or should a default disclosure rule (provider, MCO/insurer, third party as owner) prevail? 91

89 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 946 (1963); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1216 (showing that a core component of the delivery of medical care today is the use of
digitalized medical records for "multifunctional" purposes).
90 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2402 (discussing secondary information as a
"commodity that can be sold in a well-developed market"); Schwartz, supra note 11,
at 23 (discussing how consumer preferences can be cheaply processed and combined
with other personal data).
91See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2402-04 (discussing default privacy rules in
the context of the value of privacy).

THE HEALTHCARE INFORMATION TRUST

2002]

In the most simplistic situation where parties have equal
bargaining leverage, information, and choice, this issue is far
less complicated; presumably, with all transaction costs being
low, the parties will be aware of the secondary value of this information and freely negotiate. The party most valuing the inof the information will prevail and a price, including the cost
92
formation, will be incorporated into the transaction.
Most, if not all markets operate with some distortions, requiring the law to recognize the most efficient default rule: privacy or disclosure.9 3 The traditional economic view is that default disclosure rules are optimal in that "restrictions on the
flow of information in the name of privacy are generally not
social wealth maximizing, because they inhibit decisionmaking,
increase transaction costs, and encourage fraud. 9 4 Murphy and
Schwartz argue, however, that some information markets, such
as the one in health care, have significant distortions, leading to
the conclusion that a default privacy rule is optimal. Further, as
Murphy argues, these distortions justify more than a default
rule, and require "information-forcing" disclosures to individuals.95 There are four major classifications of these distortions:
(1) effect of disclosure-default on the underlying socially beneficial activity; (2) a legitimate, non-fraud oriented "taste for privacy;" (3) asymmetrical information about the secondary market value of personally identifiable information; and (4) transaction costs.
Murphy promotes a default privacy rule in markets, such as
health care, where disclosure default rules have the potential to
substantially decrease the overall amount of primary information disclosed. Murphy recognizes that where individuals, fear92

costs).

See id. at 2403 (noting that the primary question is the size of transaction

93See id. at 2404 (finding that "[t]he initial question is the ex ante question:
Would the parties agree to disclosure of this sort? Or,using a more categorical approach: What is the appropriate default rule for transactions of this sort?").
94 Id. at 2382.
95 Id. at 2416 (suggesting that "imposing nondisclosure obligations on the
recipient of the information may be the best approach for certain categories of
information"); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 73-74 (discussing the need for a default
privacy rule when attempting to access patient information). Schwartz also notes that
due to the unequal information and bargaining power between health care industry
organizations and individuals, the health care industry organizations, covered by the
default privacy rule, would be required to explicitly inform individuals of the secondary uses for which they seek to use individually identifiable healthcare information.
Id. at 61-64.
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ful of secondary disclosures, seek less of the underlying socially
beneficial activity (e.g., provision of health care), or at least
hide information useful for the efficient provision of the socially beneficial activity, the primary and secondary markets
may be hampered.96 This is the economic manifestation of the
same "utilitarian" concerns expressed earlier in the Note.
Unlike previous economic views, Murphy recognizes the
legitimacy of a "taste for privacy," which may be oriented toward a true utility for privacy of certain sensitive information,
such as that often arising in health care. 97 Although Posner
would caution against privacy as a refuge for those who would
hide their true nature in order to commit fraud,98 health care is
full of situations where privacy might be valued without any
offsetting social/economic fraud cost. For example, although a
default disclosure rule may be optimal for an individual's credit
record due the tangible possibility of fraud, 99 it is not clear that
a default disclosure rule would be optimal for health care records that reveal certain socially stigmatizing procedures, such
as a woman's abortion history. Moreover, as Schwartz argues,
the benefits of full disclosure of health care information, particularly genomic information, may be overstated in many
cases.100

Therefore, given the socially sensitive nature of much of a
person's medical record, there may be a legitimate "taste for
privacy" having no fraud implications.10 1 Although this taste for
privacy may not, in itself, balance the scales in favor of a privacy default rule, it is one more factor in its favor.
Health care also is fraught with asymmetrical information
problems. In the context of a market for health care information,
providers, MCOs, insurers and other third parties are in a position far superior to individuals in evaluating the true value of
secondary health care information. In this way, firms take advantage of a "monopoly equilibrium," exploiting consumer ig96

97

Murphy, supra note 2, at 2387.

Id. at 2396.
98See id. at 2398 (noting that fraud inhibits a group from recognizing the
heterogeneity of its membership, forcing the entire group to subsidize the unequal
costs of its members).
99 See id. at 2411-12 (discussing implied privacy contracts).
100 For example, Schwartz argues that genomic information may only be used
to reinforce employers "taste for discrimination." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 25-26.
101Murphy, supra note 2, at 2396.
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norance to gain the most favorable terms possible for the data
use.' 0 2 These entities do not disclose the value of the health care
information. Further, they have the potential to use broad and
vague waiver
forms that consumers will often accept without
°3
question.
Finally, these authors recognize the role of transaction costs
in the selection of a default privacy rule. While Posner and the
traditional law-economics school argue that transaction costs of
gaining permission to use valuable information should weigh
heavily in favor of adopting default disclosure rules, Schwartz
and Murphy raise valid counter arguments. First, Schwartz suggests that transaction costs are decreasing; in particular, the cost
of asking and tracking the preferences of consumers has become, if collected up front, minimal. 1°4 With modem technology, and with the fact that the product provider typically creates
the "contract," it is not as costly for producers to inform consumers of the value of their information, allow consumers to
specify their privacy interest, and track and safeguard this preference. 10 5 For example, the product provider may offer the customer a choice to opt-in or opt-out of the advertising. 0 6 For instance, individuals may choose to participate in their local supermarket's discount program whereby they allow their purchases to be tracked in exchange for discounted pricing. 10 7 The
supermarket can then use the information for a variety of secondary uses, not directly related to the actual purchase, such as
direct marketing through mailings and special rebate offers to
encourage selection of more profitable products.
Second, Murphy recognizes that transaction costs are important in deciding which default rule is, relatively, the most
efficient. He asks which of the two parties have the higher cost
102 Schwartz,

supra note 11, at 61 (discussing legislation that requires notice
of information that will facilitate competitive equilibrium between the individual and
the health care industry).
103See Gostfn, supra note 13, at 523-24 (discussing the theory behind routine
disclosures); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 61, 64 (suggesting that the law
needs to evolve to ensure that individuals are adequately informed before being allowed to consent to the disclosure of personal medical information).
104Schwartz, supra note 11, at 23-24.
105 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2413 (discussing the relative transaction
costs of contracting out of default disclosure rules).
106See id. (noting that a merchant could sell consumer information simply by
placing a "check-off box on the consumer-merchant contract").
107 See id. (noting that the grocery merchant prominently display a notice
concerning the information use).
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in "contracting-out" of the default rule.10 8 Undoubtedly, observing the various distortions in the health care market already discussed, individuals have a far higher cost than IDSs and MCOs
in determining and structuring a solution to contract out of the
default rule.109 Therefore, relative transaction costs in most
health care transactions also favor a default privacy rule.
Schwartz argues that a simple default rule is not enough
and that a legislative or regulatory framework must follow
health care information through all of its various uses, not just
the initial transaction, because of what he describes as the multifunctional nature of the increasingly digitalized health record." 0 Schwartz recognizes that a default privacy rule would
allow certain exceptions including safe-harbor uses "compatible
with the original collection" (e.g., direct medical care, legitimate sharing between providers for health services, and financial transactions such as for billing purposes).11 ' In addition, the
privacy default would not be imposed for legally mandated reporting such as for public health, social service reporting such
as for child abuse, and for certain medical research. 112Adopting
Gostin's concept of information holders as "trustees," the holders of health care information would also have explicit restrictions on the use of data requiring disclosures of only the mini13
mum amount necessary, based upon legitimate need-to-know.
The ability of a consumer to accept payment for release of
her data rights assumes that the consumer understands and can
enforce the bargain. One might question whether the typical supermarket shopper realizes that the pricing discounts she receives is in exchange for her buying pattern data. To this end,
Schwartz would require that proposed legislation/regulations
would also have substantial "information-forcing" and enforce108See

id. at 2412 (using the Coase Theorem to determine that the parties will

allocate the right to the party who values it the most).
109See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 54 (discussing that the establishment of a
default rule on privacy will lower transaction costs as fewer parties are forced to negotiate around the law).
110Id. at 14-17 (stating that by its very nature, the computer changes personal
information into a fluid form and therefore the need of protections should be balanced with societal use).
.".
Id. at59.
112 See id. at 69.
113 Gostin, supra note 13, at 524-25; see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 57-60
(outlining the necessary components of an effective statutory scheme for the control
of medical data).

2002]

THE HEALTHCARE INFORMATION TRUST

ment provisions. These provisions would ensure that the individual knows about her property rights in the data, can enforce
this right, and can gain access to her records. The organization
seeking to use her data for secondary purposes would be forced
to provide a waiver form, designed in the regulations, which the
individual could not be forced to sign.1 14 In addition, Schwartz
and other commentators recognize the critical need for health
trustee accountability for the use of data and call for mandatory
electronic audit trails describing all the access to, and use of,
personally identifiable health information to assist individuals
and their third-parties in policing appropriate use.115 Finally,
Gostin and Schwartz advocate the right of an individual to copy,
review, and correct personal data.116 This particular right may
have substantial implications, which will be discussed later in
this section.
C. The Privacy Default Rule in Action - HHS Electronic
Medical Records Standards
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
released final rules for standards of privacy for individually
identifiable health information.1 17 These rules were released under the auspices of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,118 requiring HHS, in absence of congressional action, to propose privacy rules for electronic records.1 19 By-and-large, these regulations realize most of
Gostin's and Schwartz's default privacy rule visions for uses of
114

See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 59-60 (discussing how the need to obtain

medical consent of the individual before using or disclosing health care data will
signal to the uninformed party about important contingencies causing negotiation for
terms that better reflect the parties wishes may be added); Gostin, supra note 13, at
522-24 (discussing patients right's in their health information).
115 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 63 (stating that one reason to advise health
care consumers that people have accessed their records is to encourage "audit trails
on a prophylactic basis"); Gostin, supra note 13, at 526 n.341 (discussing audit

trails).

Schwartz,supra note 11, at 62; Gostin, supra note 13, at 524.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164 (2000).
118 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. Law
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
119 Id. § 264(c)(1) (providing "[i]f legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information ...is not enacted
by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promulgate
final regulations containing such standards not later than [February 21, 2000]").
16
117
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information where a "consent" is required for disclosures related to provision of care, payment, and health care operations
1 20
and a written "authorization" is required for many others.
For the purposes of this Note, there are several critical outcomes of the Murphy/Schwartz model and the HHS regulations.
As Schwartz and Murphy both note, with the imposition of a
privacy default rule, a new economic picture comes into clarity.
In essence, the individual, for the first time, becomes a player in
the emerging market for health care information. The IDS, individual provider, MCO or other health plan entity, and data
clearinghouses are forced to negotiate with the individual in or121
der to be able to use that information in a secondary market.
In fact, the covered entity must use an authorization form,
which requires an explicit description of the proposed uses of
the individual's health care information. 122 Further, the form
notifies the individual of his right to refuse to sign the authorization, 123 and the covered entity is barred from conditioning its
individual's decision,1 2 4 except in certain, speciservices on the 25
1
fied situations.
The HHS regulations also incorporate individuals' access
to their medical records. 12 6 Although the commentators regard
this requirement as critical for ensuring accurate and complete
information, and to ensure legitimacy and transparency in medical record management, 127 the requirement may have broader
120

The final rule presents a separate "consent" for uses of healthcare informa-

tion for the provision of treatment, payment and healthcare operation. 45 C.F.R. §
164.506.
121Id. § 164.514(e). The Final Standards for Privacy provide for an exception
for certain types of marketing activities by a covered entity. Id. § 164.514(e)(2)(f)(2). There are, however, significant restrictions placed on this marketing use. For
example, it must come from the covered entity (or a business associate contracted to
make the communication) and the covered entity must disclose if it received remuneration for the marketing. Id. § 164.514(e)(3). Such limitations, coupled with the
agency and competition distortions faced by covered entities, as discussed infra Part
I,make it unlikely that a strong secondary market could emerge.
'2 Id. § 164.508(c).
'23Id. § 164.508 (d)(1)(iii)(B).
124 Id. § 164.508 (d)(1)(i), (e)(1)(ii).
'25 See id. § 164.508(b)(4)(i)-(iv).
126See id. §164.524.
127Gostin, supra note 13, at 524. 'Transparency" is achieved by making individuals aware of their privacy rights in information and providing them a mechanism
to guard against improper or erroneous use of the information. This is achieved by
providing individuals (1) access to their medical information, (2) the right to modify
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implications. Insofar as the regulations recognize an individual's property rights in her medical records, including the right
to "copy ' 128 these records, the individual, or her agent, may be
given the right to disgorge the electronic records from the consolidated clinical data repositories of the IDS, MCO or data repository (each falling within the framework of the HHS rules),
for use by the individual.
This ability could have striking implications for the feasibility of a far more dynamic health information market. This
market, as will be envisioned in the last section, may allow the
individual to use a new agent, the Healthcare Information Trust,
to bypass IDS/MCO control over her medical records for secondary data use.

PART II: EXISTING HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS AS HEALTHCARE
INFORMATION TRUSTEES
Having established the practical and technical possibilities
of, at least, a non-dynamic longitudinal medical record, and
having shown that a market for such data, in which individuals
can participate, may become a reality, this third part questions
whether existing market players, particularly MCOs and IDSs,
are adequate organizers of the longitudinal medical record and
brokers of personally identifiable health records on behalf of
individuals. Although Schwartz and Murphy establish a protected role for individuals in this new market, they do not address this question explicitly.
The existing players, primarily MCOs, IDSs, are suboptimal integrators of a true longitudinal medical record. This
section will discuss the economic, agency and competitive market barriers to MCOs, IDSs, as well as possible industry
cooperatives of IDSs and MCOs, emerging in this role.

or correct this information; and (3) requiring the organization to have audit records
detailing the use of their data. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 61-63.
128 See 45 C.F.R. §164.524(a) providing a "right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set" of a covered entity).
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A. Health Care Information Market Distortions in the
Murphy/Schwartz Model
Returning to the theoretical inclusionary/exclusionary
framework discussed previously, the Murphy/Schwartz model
of the emerging secondary health care market is problematic.
Negotiations between individuals and these entities allow these
entities to purchase information primarily for inclusionary purposes and for first-order exclusionary purposes against the individual.
The Murphy/Schwartz model is not dynamic enough to realize second-order exclusionary uses of data for use by the individual. Historical medical information has substantial value in
its aggregate form, across populations, to give individuals information concerning cost and quality of health services. As has
been discussed, this is the driving force behind regulatory information disclosure. 129 Of course, an individual's ability to realize personal value in this information is contingent on a
broader ability to aggregate this information with other individuals in order to analyze it for second-order exclusionary
benefit. As will be discussed, MCOs and IDSs have little incentive to use this information for such purposes. For now, it is important to note that an individual, independently, has no ability
in the Murphy/Schwartz model to realize this potential secondorder exclusionary value in his medical information.
The Murphy/Schwartz model also suffers in that it does not
recognize a variety of factors in the health care market that will
confound effective valuation of health care data. It does not
recognize the oligopolistic nature of the emerging IDS/MCO
industry, the individual's lack of choice in MCOs, and the institutional inability of MCOs and IDSs to maximize the value of
the secondary health care market data.
As previously discussed, the emerging MCO and IDS markets are consolidating at record pace. It is clear that, in most
metropolitan markets, a handful of major provider networks/
health systems are materializing. 130 An individual's ability,
129See

Sage, supra note 25, at 1715-20 (discussing competitively motivated

disclosure laws).

130 In reviewing fifteen communities nation-wide, authors conclude that, although the delivery of healthcare has not yet followed suit:
Markets are becoming more competitive. Providers that have always competed for individual patients on the basis of individual reputations and rela-
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therefore, to shop for an IDS using the treatment of secondary
health care information is, limited by the oligopolistic nature of
the emerging market.

The selection process for MCOs may be even more constrained. Typically, non-Medicare/Medicaid individuals receive
health plan benefits through their employers in this countrycoverage that is typically in an MCO. 131 In most instances,
choice of health plan coverage is substantially restricted; employers may offer only a few, and perhaps only one, MCO option. 132 In these situations, selection of a health plan based upon
its use of secondary health care information use would be difficult, if not impossible, for the individual. Further, as will be
tionships with other providers now are competing for blocs of patients on
the basis of price and organizational reputation. In response to this, health
care markets are consolidating at a rapid pace. Hospitals are consolidating
most rapidly, and physicians least rapidly.
Paul B. Ginsburg, The RWJF Community Snapshots Study: Introduction and Overview, HEALTH AFF. Summer 1996, at 15; see also Linda T. Kohn, Organizingand
Managing Care in a Changing Health System, 34 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 37, 42 (2000)
(noting in a study that "[h]ospital consolidation was happening rapidly across all
study sites.... [finding that] [i]n 10 of the 12 markets, over 50 percent of the volume
was captured by the top four hospitals or hospital systems"). The future of the IDSs
may be much more based upon strategic "e-business" connections, than outright
ownership of all components of care. See Integration Strategies,supra note 29 (stating that "[t]he IDS based on full ownership is giving way to an IDS that relies to
some degree on virtual relationships, or affiliations.... [and] [ijntegration of those
relationships probably will be achieved through some kind of e-health connection");
see also Stephen M. Shortell, Slowly Remaking the U.S. Healthcare System, 35
HEALTH SERVS. RES., 1, 1-2 (2000) (noting that hospital and institutional providers
"are more evolved in the natural history of the organizational lifecycle than is the
medical profession. For example, the hospital sector has changed from a cottage industry, up until the decade of the 1980s, to an entity that now comprises a high degree of consolidation: approximately 72 percent of the nation's hospitals belong to a
network or system").
131 See Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models for
Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 637
(1997) (estimating that seventy-three percent of Americans who receive health insurance through
their employers are enrolled in MCOs).
132 See Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination, 72 WASH. L. REV. 315, 349 (1997) (noting that "[a]ccording to
recent studies, forty-five percent of individuals who get their health insurance
through their employers are offered only one plan, and fifty-two percent of midsize
employers" offer only one plan; moreover, where employees can choose among
plans, good information about plan quality is lacking); see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controllingthe Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance:
Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037,
1045-47 (1996) (describing four techniques employers use to cut health insurance
costs).
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discussed, the purchasing agents may not incorporate such considerations into their decisionmaking and may have contrary
incentives against such restrictions of secondary use data.
Even if individuals were able to exercise a legitimate market choice concerning IDSs or MCOs based upon the consideration that they offer for secondary health care data use, these organizations will substantially undervalue the market price for
secondary health care data. Neither IDSs nor MCOs are likely
to offer this information to the full range of purchasers. For example, competing IDSs and MCOs are not likely to voluntarily
offer their patient information, a valuable resource, to competing JIDSs/MCOs, even if these organizations value secondaryuse information more highly than the original compiling
IDS/MCO. In addition, IDSs may be unsophisticated brokers of
information themselves, lacking the administrative and technical expertise to maximize the value of this information for anything other than their particular secondary uses.
All of these imperfections suggest that most consumer decisions to waive protection of their secondary health care information will be a choice absent an optimal economic incentive to encourage waiver. That is, individuals will waive their
rights to these data only if they, despite the HHS proposed rule
protections, are indifferent to privacy concerns or are entirely
uninformed about the value of their data. Moreover, even if
IDSs or MCOs offer discounts or actual payments for this
waiver, these payments will likely be less than the true value of
this information in a more dynamic market. Although this market distortion, insofar as it over inflates the population of individuals selecting total privacy, may be a desirable balance according to some privacy advocates, it defaults to a sub-optimal
use of this resource. This distortion, however, could create the
opportunity for new market entities, such as the Healthcare Information Trust, that can better value and compete for the right
to use secondary health care information.
B. Agency and Competition Problems
Agency relationships in health care today are multifaceted
and often ambiguous.13 What is clear, however, is that agency
and fiduciary obligations play a crucial role for unsophisticated
133 See

rationale).

Sage, supra note 25, 1752-64 (discussing ambiguities in the agency
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consumers faced with insurance and health care provision
choices. 134 The growth of IDSs and MCOs as primary organizers of longitudinal medical records and information brokers suffers from substantial agency/fiduciary problems, which may
make them unattractive in this role for individuals. Returning,
again, to our inclusionary/exclusionary framework, MCOs and
IDSs lack incentives to aggregate data for second-order exclusionary purposes. Further, they have substantial incentives to
use longitudinal medical records for first-order exclusionary
purposes against individuals.
1. Agency Problems
Sage presents an interesting picture of the agency problems
arising in today's health care system. 135 Prior to the current
market-oriented managed care competition system, agency and
fiduciary concerns were far less acute. 136 As cost control measures in health care financing have become a driving force in the
delivery of services, a fracture has occurred between what Sage
describes as the individual/professional and the collective/economic interests of both the health care financing and
health care delivery stakeholders.137 This is best illustrated by
contrasting the traditional individual/professional agency and
1 38
fiduciary obligations of the physician-patient relationship,
with the collective/economic fiduciary obligations imposed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security139Act (ERISA) to
maximize the financial resources of the plan.
The real picture is, however, far more muddled. Managed
competition imposes new agency obligations onto physicians
and other providers. Physicians may accept a role as primary
care gatekeepers with multiple obligations to both patient (contractual and fiduciary) as well as proxy managers of subsequent
referrals and health service utilization for MCOs (contrac-

134 See id. at 1743-45 (discussing the general nature of agency relationships in
health care).
135Id. at 1743-64.
136See id. at 1744 (noting that the "rapid conversion of the American health
system to37managed care has magnified the need to safeguard agency relationships").
1 Id. at 1752.
138 See id. at 1752-57.
139See id. at 1744-45 (noting that "trustees administering ERISA plans owe
their loyalty to the plan, not individual beneficiaries").
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tual). 14° Specialist physicians may be contractors with MCOs
where their payment, through withholds or other mechanisms, is
41
based upon health care claims experience of their patients.'
Moreover, as Sage notes, individual physicians may have even
less control over patients in developing IDSs which, themselves, have a myriad of often conflicting agency relationships
and financial incentives. 42 Indeed, IDSs may accept capitation
agreements, which align their financial incentives toward collective/economic duties and away from obligations to the individual patient. These conflicting obligations are, therefore, not
simply between the individual/professional duties of health care
providers and the collective/economic obligations of health care
financing entities; these two conflicting obligations have been,
to a greater or lesser degree, internalized into health care deliverers.
This agency obligation challenge is, perhaps, even more
exacerbated in the employer/employee and the beneficiary/government-as-payor relationships. As already stated, ERISA plans have a primary fiduciary obligation to the collective
performance of the plan, with limited, if any, obligation to an
143
individual's heterogeneous needs outside of the collective.
Moreover, the government, as payor in Medicare and Medicaid
programs, has made substantial moves to control, or at least
make more predictable, collective costs through Medicare
HMOs, 144 Medicare+Choice 14 5 and state-driven Medicaid man-

14' See id. at 1745-46 (discussing how changes in managed care payment
systems have motivated physicians to become more concerned with finance rather
than patient care).
141See id. at 1745 n.151 (discussing how managed care has developed an
extraordinary diversity of provider compensation mechanisms).
142Id. at 1754 (discussing how institutional processes such as the health plan
can often effect overall quality when compared to physicians serving as individuals'
agents).
141 Id. at 1755 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
144 See, e.g., Marilyn Moon & Karen Davis, Preserving and Strengthening
Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 31-32 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of private sector ability to control Medicare cost through managed care programs and governmental focus on this strategy).
145 See John K. Iglehart, Bringing Forth Medicare+Choice:HCFA's Robert
A. Berenson, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb., 1999, at 144, 149 (discussing HCFA's program
improvement efforts).
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aged care programs. 146 This demonstrates federal and state government's focus on its collective obligation.
Therefore, although such incentives encourage larger purchasers to force IDSs and MCOs to report information that allows them to differentiate by access, price and quality, this disclosure may well be used against individuals. Schwartz outlines
several instances where this has already been the case in the
employer-employee relationship including the use of health history in hiring decisions. 147
2. Competition Problems
In addition to agency problems in the secondary health care
information market, IDSs and MCOs face substantial barriers in
seeking to use information for inclusionary and second-order
exclusionary uses to benefit consumers. Although expanding the
amount of information usable by consumers and providers is a
well-regarded strategy, 148 regulatory disclosure schemes are inadequate to realize the full potential of a longitudinal medical
record. Moreover, the structure of the MCO and IDS market,
lack of adequate information incorporated in an individual organization, and lack of adequate incentives to coordinate information among competitors, may make it impossible to realize
the benefits of a fully "inclusive" and "comprehensive" consolidation of longitudinal medical records in the existing health
care market.
Notwithstanding the growing consolidation of MCOs and
IDSs, the health care market is not monopolistic in most cases.
Purchasers of health plan/MCO services and medical care often
switch between various competing organizations. 149 This is
quite pronounced in the employer health insurance arena where
employees may frequently change plans at the end of coverage
146 See, e.g., ROBERT HURLEY & STEPHEN ZucKERMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE,
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: STATE FLEXIBILITY IN ACTION

8-11 (Mar. 2002) (discuss-

ing the origins of Medicaid managed care and motivations, among others, to make

costs more predictable and to reduce program expenses).
147 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 28-31 (explaining how increased disclosure
may allow employers access to potentially harmful health information, which could
increase health-related discrimination against employees).

148 Sage, supra note 25, at 1704.

149 See Peter J. Cunningham & Linda Kohn, Health Tracking; Health Plan
Switching: Choice Or Circumstance?,HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 158-59 (noting that seventeen percent of privately insured persons changed their health plan during the year prior to the survey).
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periods. This mobility, often based more on employer plan
changes than any other factors, 150 not only complicates the incentives to develop strategies for long-term population health
performance, 151 but fractures the full record of individuals
among competing MCOs and competing IDSs.
Some commentators observe that MCOs, due to their characteristics as large-population data-holders, are attractive consolidators of health care information.152 Further, for at least as
long as an individual is covered by the MCO, the MCO holds
information about utilization across providers, thus integrating
information regardless of where an individual is treated, providing a claim is submitted. MCOs, however,
do not have the com53
patients.
of
record
medical
prehensive
Likewise, although IDSs are beginning to compile greater
clinical information, individuals may often seek care outside of
a particular IDS, either with still-independent providers or with
a competing delivery system. Thus, although they can increasingly integrate information within their own system, large holes
exist in their records.
The current market lacks a mechanism or entity to coordinate secondary health care information across organizations.
Sage suggests that a system of mandatory reporting of politically chosen cost, access and quality measures could address
current inadequacy in use of health information for the benefit
of consumers. However, such a regimen, even if it could realize
Sage's criteria for success, still suffers from this fractionalization of information. That is, the reporting will not incorporate
the full records of individuals, but rather, snapshots of the populations within MCOs or those using IDS services during the period. This brings us back to a vision of either a single, regional
repository of a fully integrated medical record for individuals
150 See id. (noting that most plan changes were made for reasons other than

consumer preference, including 33% due to employment change, 36.3% due to
change in employer plan offerings; 16% changed because the current plan is less
expensive; only 8% changed because their current plan has better services, higher
quality, preferred doctors, or more convenient locations).
1 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1777 (discussing how stable enrollment in a
health care plan by an individual is necessary to facilitate practice-based research and
to motivate health plans to focus on long-term performance).
152 See id. at 1726-27 (discussing the advantages of centralized disclosure by
health plans).
151 Id. at 1727.
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or, at least, agreements among competing systems to allow
shared use of medical records.
MCOs and IDSs, however, lack the financial incentives to
cooperate in such a manner. First, organizations realize the strategic value of health information they hold; they understand that
the use of this information to differentiate themselves based
upon "inclusionary" benefits to the individual would be lost if
the information were released to a collective entity. Second, the
information, particularly if it is comprehensive, has the potential to be used for second-order exclusionary purposes with uncertain consequences to the contributing organization. Although
organizations perceiving their services to be higher quality may
be more inclined to share, at least some organizations would
realize the risk in such cooperation. The free-rider problem
where only a few voluntarily share information would make it
infeasible to implement a comprehensive longitudinal medical
record or voluntary information disclosures under the
154 current
system without substantial governmental intervention.
Moreover, the funding and structure of such cooperative efforts would be problematic. These efforts pose significant antitrust implications, particularly where cost and pricing information may be shared. 155 But more than this, the practical ability of
various competitors coming together and agreeing on anything
more than the sharing of generic discharge or outpatient information, stripped of individually identifiable information, is
probably not feasible. As one privacy advocate notes,
"[c]ommand over information and its transmission will be the
key to success in the capitalist world of tomorrow. The notion
that this crucial resource will be [voluntarily] allowed
to be156
come a public good is idealism at its most inane."

154See Ren6 Bowser & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Managed Care and the Health of
a Nation, 72 S.CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1281 (1999) (describing how the government
must take on some leadership role in the oversight of managed health care if noncompetitive information sharing is to be successful).
155See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE § 3, http://www.fte.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (discussing the antitrust implications of
hospital15joint
ventures).
6
WHITAKER, supra note 74, at 69.
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3. Examples of Agency and Competition Problems
There are examples that demonstrate the agency and the
competitive problems in the emergence of market collaborations
to manage secondary health care data. The examples, discussed
below, include: (1) the Medical Information Bureau; (2) the
Massachusetts Health Data Consortium, Inc. and its Affiliated
Health Information Network of New England; and (3) Health
Action Council's Cleveland Health Quality Choice initiative.
The Medical Information Bureau is an insurance industry
medical information clearinghouse.157 The clearinghouse gathers information from approximately 700 insurance companies 1in
58
the United States and Canada, which also fund its operation.
The companies that the Medical Information Bureau serve represent ninety-nine percent of the individual life insurance policies and eighty percent of health59 and disability policies issued
in the United States and Canada.1
The Medical Information Bureau currently holds files on
over fifteen million Americans. 160 It collects medical information from people who apply for insurance policies, which is then
computerized and sold back to other participating insurance
companies when they evaluate an enrollee for subsequent coverage.161 Its files track over 230 coded medical conditions, and
has other information concerning 1behavioral
risk factors and
62
limited financial credit information.
As one privacy advocate noted, the Medical Information
Bureau is not a service for individual consumers. 163 It is, however, an excellent proxy for the type of collaborative efforts
most likely to spontaneously emerge from a competitive insurance-driven MCO market. The Medical Information Bureau operates exclusively to provide first-order exclusionary benefit for
the insurance industry. It is fascinating to note the age of the
organization. The organization was founded in 1890 as an informal group of insurance company directors meeting to avoid
157 Savidge, supra note 11, at Dl.
258 Reed, supranote II.

159Savidge, supra note I1, at Dl.
1
60 id.
161Id.

162 Id. Examples of behavior risk factors are adverse driving records and
whether the applicant fly small planes. Id.
163 See id. (quoting Janlori Goldman, who notes that the MIB is "not interested in talking about what they do").
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fraud and minimize financial risk. 164 This aptly demonstrates
that, even in competitive markets, collaboration that holds a
strong economic benefit to constituents will tend to emerge.
However, there is no indication that the Medical Information
Bureau might evolve beyond its current, and highly successful,
role.
In a number of markets nationally, consortiums of hospitals
and health systems, health plans, and governmental agencies
have developed to create regional networks to share various
1 65
medical information among health care industry constituents.
The Massachusetts Health Data Consortium, Inc. (Consortium)
and its Affiliated Health Information Network of New England
(AHINNE), recognized by the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation as one of a number of successful regional organizers of information, is a solid and progressive example of such consortium groups.
The Consortium was created in 1978 by a number of Massachusetts' major public and private health care organizations. 166 The objective of the Consortium was to facilitate,
through a non-partial intermediary, the collection, analysis and
dissemination of health care information. 167 Throughout its
twenty-two year history, it has been extremely successfully in
creating1 70
a variety of information reports, 68 products169 and databases.
164id.
165 See

Press Release, Minnesota Health Data Institute, Health Privacy and

Technology Effort Receives $2.5 Million National Grant for Five State Project (Jan.
11, 2000) (noting leading regional consortiums receiving Robert Wood Johnson
grants to develop secure email protocol: Massachusetts Health Data Consortium
(MHDC), Minnesota Health Data Institute (MHDI), North Carolina Health Information and Communications Alliance (NCHICA), Utah Health Information Network
(UHIN) and the Pacific Northwest-based Community Health Information Technology
Alliance (CHITA) which is a program of the Foundation for Health Care Quality in
Seattle), http:llwww.mhdilpress-releases/2000/pr-1-11-2000.html.
166 MASSACHUSET'S HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: BACKGROUND AND HIs-

at http://www.mahealthdata.org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/Documents/Background (last
visited Mar.
21, 2002).
167
TORY,

id.

168 See MASSACHUSETrS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM:

20 YEARS IN HEALTH

CARE, at http:/www.mahealthdata.orgmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e8525645
80073a9fd/b88319ae14ce86268525663b0067b05e?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
21, 2002) (noting the 1978 establishment of a patient database on all Massachusetts

residents permitting detection of patterns of disease and treatment; 1979 patient origin study determining where residents receive inpatient treatment; 1983 comparison

of costs in the State's 111 acute-care hospitals; 1988 physician supply study; 1989

430

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:393

Today the Consortium encompasses an impressive list of
institutional, technology, and partner organizations spanning the
New England health care market. 171 In 1994 the Consortium established AHINNE in an effort to facilitate the development of
a regional "electronic network for moving, storing and sharing
patient information" and to "link providers, payers, employers,
government agencies, physician offices and others and measure
172
outcomes, analyze care costs and support care delivery."
The Consortium and its AHINNE effort have been impressive and should in no way be discounted. Their various data
products and databases have, undoubtedly, provided a wide
range of inclusionary and exclusionary benefits to the region's
health care users and expert purchasers, as shown by the wide
range of utilization, cost, and public health reporting initiatives.
Nonetheless, the Consortium's collected data, and market
reports primarily focuses on aggregate inpatient discharge and
outpatient procedural data.173 The nature of the reporting, such
as hospital discharge and outpatient procedure information, is
likely to be a strong benefit to each of the market participants,
particularly the participating hospitals, in identifying marketshare, facility/service planning and cost comparisons that the
member institutions can access for their own planning interests. 174 Moreover, the Consortium notes, in its case studies, a
studies of elders, mothers and children utilizing state data to monitor access, quality
and cost) [hereinafter 20 YEARS IN HEALTH CARE].
169 See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: SERVICES & PROJECTS,

at http: /lwww.mahealthdata.org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/DocumentsOfferings (last visited
Mar. 21, 2002) (noting standard management reports on Insurer & Health Plan
Analysis, Hospital and Physician Analysis, Case Mix Profiles, Charge Analysis,
Market Share Analysis, Competitive Trend Analysis, Patient Origin by Town and
Hospital, Discharge Disposition by Town and Hospital) [hereinafter SERVICES &
PROJECTS].
170 See id. (noting the Inpatient Database, Medicaid Ambulatory Database,
Medicare Ambulatory Database, Ambulatory Surgery Database Project, Physician
Licensure Database).
171 MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: MEMBER LISTINGS, at http:
I/www.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsflDocumentslMembers (last visited Mar. 21,
2002).
17220 YEARS INHEALTH CARE, supra note 168.
173See SERVICES & PROJECTS, supra note 169 (noting the Inpatient Database,
Medicaid Ambulatory Database, Medicare Ambulatory Database, Ambulatory Surgery Database Project, Physician Licensure Database).
174See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: INPATIENT DATABASE,

at http://www.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9

fd/eaaafe2fb4ceOf77862565afOO55ec5l?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
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predominant number of uses for these competitive market comparison purposes. 175 It is questionable whether, without this mutual competitive benefit, the Consortium would exist. Moreover,
as will be seen in the example of Cleveland Health Quality
Choice, the long-term viability of the Consortium may also be
questionable should the New England market consolidate into
fewer IDSs and MCOs.
The Consortium, through its AHINNE initiative, has been
leading an effort to establish a regional information infrastructure among participating providers and MCOs. 176 The group announced in 1996 efforts to create this network, including electronic access to medical records among its constituency. 177 AHINNE rejected the concept of "[riegional centralized data repositories," promoting, instead, initiatives to build "'virtual'
network[s]" among key stakeholders in the New England market. 178 A consolidated clinical repository has been described as
"costly, difficult to implement, and impractical for such a wide
variety of data sources."'179 Further a centralized data repository
of more comprehensive medical records has been presented as a
greater threat to confidentiality
of medical records than busi180
ness-to-business integration.
AHINNE's networking initiatives have been driven by operational data sharing needs, primarily between providers and
payors, automating business to business needs (i.e., electronic
data interchange of claims information)' 81 rather than more far
(noting the data elements and reporting available from the inpatient database; notably, cost information is not available and the orientation of standard reports is toward
hospital planning: market share, market share trends, patient origination, and clinical
service trends
within hospitals).
75

1 See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM, OUR CLIENTS TELL THE

STORY (noting a "summary" of 1999 data requests revealing that of eleven listed,

nine are for competitive market positioning of services), http://www.mahealthdata.
org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9fd/9817b442d9f7984386256
5b000686012?OpenDocument
(last visited Apr. 20, 2000).
17 6
BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25.
177See Eric Convey, Group Touts Medical Info Access, BOSTON HERALD,
Mar. 29, 1996, at B30.
17 8

BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25.

179 Id.

180

See also Convey, supra note 177 (noting the statement that it is easier to

protect patient confidentiality under a system of connected networks than a central
data repository).
181 Julie Jette, System to Standardize Medical Information, PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Mass), Mar. 31, 2000, at B6 (quoting Julia Cooney, an expert on the development of the electronic transaction standards from Deloitte & Touche, noting that
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reaching networking of clinical records. At present, there seems
little initiative to develop an infrastructure to facilitate more
than transactional medical information sharing,1 82 and certainly
not the scope of longitudinal medical record sharing envisioned
in this Note.
Cleveland Health Quality Choice began in 1989 by a group
of the region's largest employers. 83 Participants included the
Greater Cleveland Hospital Association, the Academy of Medicine and the Health Action Council of Northeastern Ohio, 184 the

spearheading organization of the quality reporting initiative
now representing fifteen major employers and the Council of
Smaller Enterprises (COSE). COSE brought an additional 700
smaller businesses to group. In 1996 the groups
represented
85
more than 350,000 employees and dependants.
Cleveland Health Quality Choice was created in order to
identify and implement a "common set" of quality measurements of market hospitals and health systems.18 The group created the quality measuring through work with physicians and
statisticians, with the objective of comparing likely and actual
outcomes, using elements such as "mortality, patient satisfac188
tion and length of stay,"'187 controlling for severity of illness.
The employer groups have utilized the data to negotiate bulk
contracts with higher quality facilities in certain specialties, decreasing costs to members.1 89

business-to-business e-commerce as mandated in government regulations is the driving force82behind AHINNE pilot program networking).
1 See BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25 (noting as the only substantive initiative underway an effort to use secured email to share patient medical information).
183Christopher Dauer, Nestle Exec Raps U.S. Health System, NAT. UNDERwRrrER Mar. 18, 1991, at 21, 28.
1I4
id.

185See Grant Segall, Doctoring the Way We Rate Hospitals, PLAIN DEALER,

Sept. 16, 1996, at B1.
186
Dauer, supra note 183, at 28.
187 Segall, supra note 185, at B1.
188See Joan M. Mazzolini, Hospital Review Set for Release, PLAIN DEALER,
Mar.18, 1993, at BI (noting severity adjustments); see also Segall, supra note 185, at

B 1 (noting that despite criticisms concerning effectiveness of measurements, outside
experts have reviewed the rating system finding it 'about the best that have been done
anywhere').
189See Joan Mazzolini, Area Businesses to Give Hospital Contracts Based on
Performance,PLAIN DEALER, May 17, 1996, at Al (stating that the contracts went "to

hospitals that have received good marks on report cards rating quality of care").
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The efforts by the Cleveland Health Quality Choice, however, had been strongly criticized by participating health systems as early as 1993.190 The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, one
of the Cleveland institutions developing IDSs, increasingly attacked the program, calling for a complete overhaul. 191 As the
Cleveland health care market began consolidating under increasing competitive and pricing pressures, commentators noted
that the Cleveland Health Quality Choice reporting played an
important role in ensuring quality of care. 192 Nonetheless,
considerable criticism of the Cleveland Health Quality Choice
and the Health Action Council's use of its data in designating
Centers of Excellence for 193
employer contracting continued
through the mid to late 1990s.
By the late 1990s, two IDSs had emerged in the Cleveland
health care market-University Hospitals Health System of
Cleveland and the Cleveland Clinic Health System. 194 Other
budding IDSs either left the market, in the case of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. (after its failed attempt to acquire
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ohio), 195 or went bankrupt, as did the
Physician Health Systems network. 196 Although the effectiveness of the Cleveland Health Quality Choice program in realizing true savings for its participants may be questioned, 197 many
considered it to have increased quality in the Cleveland market.
190 See Mazzolini, supra note 188, at B1 (noting the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and University Hospitals of Cleveland were most critical of the reporting and
that the Cleveland Clinic Foundation might withdraw); see also Segall, supra note
196, at BI (accusing Quality Choice of mismeasuring risks and outcomes).
191 Segall, supra note 185, at 1; see also Raquel Santiago, Mixon Hits
Hospital Rating Program, CRAiN'S CLEVELAND BusINESS, May 19, 1997, at 3

(discussing Cleveland Clinic director Malachi Mixon's criticism of the project for
inaccuracy and expense).
192 See Joan Mazzolini, Hospital Grade Card Effort Wants Larger Role,
PLAIN DEALER, May 25, 1995, at B 1 (noting how "having someone looking at quality

helps keep everyone from the great temptation of cutting back too far").
19 See Joan Mazzolini, Hospitals Rebel at Quality Ratings, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 9, 1997, at 1; Raquel Santiago, HospitalsAssail DesignationSystem, CRAIN'S
CLEVELAND

Bus., Oct. 13, 1997, at 3.

194 Diane Solov, Building Health-Care Empires, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 16,

1997, at Hi.
195Diane

PLAIN DEALER,
96

Solov, Survival Of Strongest Proves Operative Rule for Hospitals,

Mar. 9, 2000, at Al.

1 See Regina McEnery & Diane Solov, Amid New Efforts to Save Hospitals,
Court
Clears
Way to a Shutdown, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
197 Troy Flint, Health Program'sGoal Difficult To Achieve, PLAIN DEALER, February

26, 1999, at 1C.
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The market consolidation, nonetheless, made it possible for
Cleveland Clinic Health System to pull out of the program with
its system hospitals. 198 The Cleveland Health Quality Choice
program was "snuffed out" by this action. 199 Later, when the
Health Action Council attempted to develop a new quality
measurement program, the other major IDS, University Hospitals Health System, followed the Cleveland Clinic Health System's lead and refused to participate. 00
As the Cleveland Health Quality Choice experience demonstrates, the ability of larger Cleveland purchasers to provide
second-order exclusionary benefit to its health care consumers
has been largely frustrated as the market has consolidated. This
may be due to lack of bargaining power in the wake of increasingly consolidated and powerful IDSs and the reciprocal inability to contractually disgorge primary information from IDSs and
MCOs. The fact that an organization representing over 350,000
members would be unable to force IDSs to participate in quality
management studies is a staggering observation. Is external
monitoring of quality data simply irrelevant to health care decisions as the Cleveland IDSs argue? The Health Action Council
does not think so, as evidenced by its continual effort to force
health care information data from the IDSs.
Due to these structural barriers, Sage has argued for a governmental role in forcing the disclosure of health care quality
information by MCOs and IDSs, in order to support private decisions 2° 1by individuals and, primarily, their expert agents. He
does, however, recognize the substantial barrier for the political
system working with health care industry stakeholders to develop such a structure, absent a clear consensus on the primacy
of individual versus collective agency relationships,2 0 2 and
given the competitive issues discussed above. Although Sage
concludes his observation about these barrier on an optimistic
note, and suggests that the current ambiguities in agency rela198 See Joan Mazzolini, Clinic Drops Out of Hospital Report Card Program,
PLAiN DEALER, Jan. 9, 1999, at Al (discussing reasons for the Clinic pulling out).
199 Troy Flint, Hospital ProgramSnuffed Out, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 25, 1999,

at Cl.
200 See Sandra Livingston, Largest Hospitals Shunning Consumer Guide to
Health Care, PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 1999, at Cl.
201Sage, supra note 25, at 1708-9.
202 See id. at 1756-57 (stating that for disclosure to be an effective tool to

improve health care, greater consensus regarding the obligations of the parties involved will be required).
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tionships, in particular, may be simply transitional, 2 3 he provides no final solution to this dilemma.
For our purposes, and at least as far as the use of secondary
health care information is concerned, the current health care
market may be structurally incapable of optimizing the inclusionary/exclusionary benefits of this information without either
trampling on an individual's interests in her own medical information or unduly restricting secondary medical information
and its value. This disturbing possibility leads us to the final
section of this Note, discussing the possibility of a new player
in the health care information market-the Healthcare Information Trust.
PART IV: -EALTHCARE INFORMATION TRUST
Although a fictional organization, medical information
trusts have been proposed in a similar context previously-at
least as an abstract property categorization. Gottlieb has proposed the trust as an optimum property model for the protection
of residual property interests of individuals in tissue samples
collected in tissue repositories. 204 Gostin suggest that all holders
of health care information have a fiduciary responsibility to the
and are, thereindividuals to whom the information
20 5 pertains,
trustees.'
information
fore, 'health
The purpose of this part is to present a possible framework
for the Healthcare Information Trust, using the property concept
of a trust as guide, and discussing some of its potential advantages and major barriers to its creation. The full scope of such a
proposed entity deserves more detailed attention than provided
in this final part. It is the author's hope that this Note will generate interest in fully exploring the possibilities of a Healthcare
Information Trust.
A. Healthcare Information Trust Structure
As its name suggests, the Healthcare Information Trust is a
legal trust that controls a person's individually identifiable
medical information for the benefit of the individual. The trust,
203

Id. at 1756.

204 Karen Gottlieb, Human BiologicalSamples and the Laws of Property:The

Trust as a Model for BiologicalRepositories, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 182 (Robert F. Wier ed., 1998).
205

Gostin, supra note 13, at 524-25.
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as a fiduciary agent, is assigned, by the individual, her property
interest in her health care information held by any provider,
health care plan or health care data clearinghouse. With the
emergence of IDS and MCO clinical data repositories and data
warehouses, the Trust could economically gain access to preconsolidated individually identifiable information through the
person's assignable right to copy her information. Practically,
the Healthcare Information Trust may link into the IDSs' or
MCOs' clinical data repositories or, if this is impractical, or resisted, force the periodic transfer of this individually identifiable medical and transactional information into the Healthcare
Information Trust's own data repository. Although records will
remain with the IDS or MCO for their own "primary" data use
for the direct benefit of the individual's episode of care and for
health care financial transactions, the Healthcare Information
Trust, alone, would have the necessary waiver from the individual to use the data for "secondary" purposes. The creation of a
Healthcare Information Trust recognizes that the current market
is inadequate to realize protection for individuals in the secondary use of their health care information for purposes that provide them inclusionary benefit and second-order exclusionary
benefits, while still protecting individuals from adverse firstorder exclusionary uses.
Trust relationships are frequent in health care where an
agent is needed to provide expert assistance. For example, the
basics of the physician-patient relationship are felt, by some
courts and commentators to incorporate the concept of fiduciary
trust.20 6 Other types of trust, such as those embodied in ERISA
plans already discussed, are also examples.20 7 These relationships arise in situations where a potential trust beneficiary
would benefit by an expert agent, who, due to the experts capabilities and asymmetrical knowledge, can achieve a benefit for
the beneficiary that the beneficiary might be unable to achieve
alone. Further, fiduciary law, inherent in trustee-beneficiary relationships, has evolved recognizing that more vulnerable par206 See Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 532 N.E.2d 327, 331
(Ill. 1988) (disagreeing with other jurisdictions that allow ex parte communications
between a treating physician and his patient's legal adversary); Alexander v. Knight,
177 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1962) (finding that doctor breached his fiduciary duty to his patient when he induced another doctor to breach a confidential relationship with that
patient).207
See Sage, supra note 25, at 1744.
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ties (beneficiaries) need to be protected from the more powerful
agent.2 °8
The concept of fiduciary is central to the concept of a
Healthcare Information Trust and is its major advantage over
other market players that might play this role. The trustee, when
assigned the assets of the trust (i.e., individually identifiable

healthcare information) would be obligated to make the trust
20 9
property productive for the benefit of the trust beneficiary.
The trustee's obligation, unlike IDSs or MCOs who may be subject to a variety of competing interests, is oriented only toward
the interests of the beneficiary.
A trust, as a legal creation, is not difficult to implement. It
can be created by the express intent of the settlor to establish it,
and requires no special process or writing, so long as the purposes of the trust are adequately described in the trust agreement.2 10 The settlor of the trust must have an ownership interest
in the trust asset, 211 which would be satisfied by most state laws
recognizing ownership in the information
within medical re2 13
cords 212 and by the HHS regulations.

208

Gottlieb, supranote 204, at 193.

2)9 AusTiN W. ScoTr & WLLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 181
(4th ed.21987).
10
Id. § 17.1.
211 Id.§ 75.
212 Paul V. Stearns, Access to and Cost of Reproduction of PatientMedical
Records: A Comparisonof State Laws, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 79 (2000) (tracing the evolution of common law and statutory property rights of patients in their medical records). The author concludes that the popular view has become that "[w]hen patients
pay for treatment, whether directly, through health insurance, or via taxes for some
type of subsidized care, they pay not only for diagnosis and treatment but also for
information [thus, forming a property right in this information]." Id. at 104.
213 Although not calling it a property right, per se, HHS noted in its proposed
rule certain rights that patients may exercise, which have been maintained in the final
rule:
We are proposing to establish several basic rights for individuals with
respect to their protected health information. We propose that individuals
be able to obtain access to protected health information about them, which
would include a right to inspect and obtain a copy of such information....
The right of access would extend to an accounting of disclosures of the
protected health information for purposes other than treatment, payment,
and health care operations.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,917, 59,926 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999).
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A critical issue for the Healthcare Information Trust would
be its ability to financially sustain itself after initial funding. At
this point, a mature market for secondary health care information has not yet been realized, despite evidence of secondary
health care information use for a variety of commercial uses.
Nonetheless, it may be possible for the Healthcare Information
Trust to create a secondary health care market sufficient to fund
its operations.
The HHS Final Standards for Privacy do not explicitly

contemplate an organization such as the Healthcare Information
Trust. Nonetheless, under the HHS regulations, information
concerning individuals may be assigned to third parties, such as
IDSs or MCOs, for secondary use purposes. This implies that an
individual may assign her rights, not to an MCO, IDS or other
existing health care organization, but to the Healthcare Information Trust. Once assigned, the information would be usable by
the Trust for any purposes specified in the trust agreement,
which would incorporate the waiver provisions required by the
HHS Final Standards for Privacy. Since secondary uses of

health care information by MCOs, IDSs, and other health care
organizations is prohibited except with explicit authorization by
the individual (and except as allowed in restricted circumstances by the final rule), such a trust agreement would provide
the Healthcare Information Trust a virtual monopoly over its
beneficiary population's information-a commodity that may
become extremely valuable.
The structure also has the benefit that it can allow the
Healthcare Information Trust, or its licensed agents, to act as an
intermediary that can unlock the inclusionary and second-order
exclusionary benefits of the data for the consumer, or the consumer's health care, or insurance purchasing agents. This is best
described through example whereby pharmaceutical information
would be "marketed" to trust beneficiaries.
First, the Healthcare Information Trust would allow individual beneficiaries the ability to choose the level of communication they wish from pharmaceutical companies. Based upon
beneficiaries' individual and collective willingness to accept
communications, the Healthcare Information Trust could offer a
menu of demographic information to interested pharmaceutical
companies interested in a precisely targeted population. The
pharmaceutical firm might then identify its "target demographic," selecting from possibly hundreds of characteristics the
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Healthcare Information Trust tracks, and pay the Trust for the
privilege of marketing to its selected group through the Healthcare Information Trust. In this manner, no individually identifiable information-in fact, not even aggregated information-is
passed to the pharmaceutical company. In such a model, the
consumer benefits from access to inclusionary benefits, but individually identifiable health care information is safeguarded by
the Trustee. Facilitated communication replaces the concern of
"privacy" of information in the Healthcare Information Trust.
This, of course, raises several questions. First, why would
enterprises, such as pharmaceutical companies, wish to purchase this type of access? Such "targeted marketing" efforts,
and the willingness of enterprises to focus their marketing dollars on core customers, is not a completely novel concept. Farthinking marketing experts have begun to observe the materialization of what some call one-to-one 214 or "permissionmarketing." 215 They observe that, as more and more information
is collected on consumers, firms will have far greater ability to
identify their optimal customers and to target them for superspecialized goods and services. 216 Others observe that the focus
on mass interruption marketing, 21 7 such as television, radio,
billboard and other advertisements, will be increasingly augmented by firms' efforts, once they have identified their core
customers, to customize marketing programs to much smaller,
homogeneous groups or even individuals2 1- 8 and establish a level
of two-way dialogue and trust with the customer.219 These organizations will then focus on gaining greater market share
214

See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76 (highlighting the one-to-one theory

behind consumer collaboration).
215 See generally GODIN, supra note 83, at 60-69 (discussing permission and
one-to-one marketing).
216 See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 3-7 (stating that the "old paradigm, a system of mass production, mass media, and mass marketing, is being replaced by a totally new paradigm, a one-to-one economic system").
217 See id. at 10 (calling it "awareness" advertising or "mass media"); see also
GODiN, supra note 83, at 53-56 (discussing history of interruption marketing).
218 See GODIN, supra note 83, at 64 (discussing techniques to turn customers
into "supercustomers"); see also PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 10 (noting that
1:1 media are individually addressable).
219 See GODIN, supra note 83, at 79-96 (discussing how frequency builds
trust); PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 10-11, 51-94 (discussing the necessity of
a two way dialogue with customers and customer "collaboration" as a means to
facilitate this dialogue).

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:393

from its core, most profitable, customers. 220 Godin argues that
in the future, dialogue
with core customers will be an incredibly
2 21
valuable commodity.
Godin and Peppers & Rogers focus on the product-selling
firms as the organizer of this "permission marketing" and producer-consumer "dialogue." This Note argues that due to the
sensitivity of health care information and the property right that
individuals have in their information, the Healthcare Information Trust might emerge as the facilitator of this interaction. Insofar as we are moving into a world in which firms will pay
substantial sums to develop a "dialogue" (i.e., for the privilege
of presenting product information and gathering information on
consumers), the Healthcare Information Trust could use this
market to sustain its administrative costs. Moreover, due to the
Standards of Privacy rules and the Healthcare Information
Trust's monopoly over its beneficiaries' data, these third parties
would be forced to use the Healthcare Information Trust as an
intermediary, or entirely forgo a truly "1:1 dialogue" with that
population.
The Healthcare Information Trust could also be a superior
investment vehicle for government in promoting population disease management and medical records research. Bowser and
Gostin argue that "well considered delegations, incentives and
regulations" might create partnerships between government and
MCOs to promote "public health"2 22 since MCOs are emerging
as the key holders of health care information. 2 3 The authors
contend that regulatory governmental intervention is best to
solve such a problem and to focus investment in crosscompetitor market initiatives to provide inclusionary and second-order exclusionary benefits to consumers. 2 4 Bowser and
Gostin go so far as to suggest seed money for their initiatives,
supposing support similar to the HMO Act of 1973.25
The Healthcare Information Trust could be, however, at
least a comparable solution in promotion of inclusionary bene220

See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 18-19, 123 (describing the logis-

tics of applying
the one-to-one theory to customer market).
21
GODIN, supra note 83, at 74-78, 94-96, 131-42.
222 Bowser & Gostin, supranote 154, at 1214.
223 See id. at 1280 (discussing MCO development of comprehensive patient
records).
224 See id. at 1281.
225Id. at 1281-82.
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fits (e.g., screening notices, collective management of diseases
such as asthma in broader populations) as well as second-order
exclusionary benefits (e.g., whole population HEDIS reporting).
In fact, the government might be a primary purchaser of information from the Trust for government-funded clinical research,
public health research, and to coordinate government-initiated
inclusionary benefit initiatives for target populations. Moreover,
the Healthcare Information Trust would far more effectively
consolidate resources by providing a central repository of medical information, collection of which is occurring now on an individual, ad hoc, and highly inefficient basis. Much of the data
used in federally funded clinical research is already collected in
medical records,226 but is difficult, extremely costly, or even
Impossible to access because of its location across the islands of
data discussed in this Note. By refocusing resources on consolidation of primary sources through a Healthcare Information
Trusts, duplication of efforts may be avoided.
Finally, the Healthcare Information Trust would also be far
more responsive to market pressures than government-industry
partnerships. The second order exclusionary information reported from the Healthcare Information Trust, or its expert
agents, would be, ostensibly, the information most desired by
individuals and their expert purchasers, rather than those selected by a political process subject to timing delays and to capture by special interests.227 Therefore, this Note suggests that
the government should explore investment in Healthcare Information Trusts if "seed money" becomes available, opening further funding options for the entity.
The second question is what benefit would such a trust arrangement have for consumers? First, beneficiaries might have
direct financial returns once a mature secondary health care
market emerges. Insofar as the revenue received by selling access to this information exceeds administrative costs, a premium
or annuity might be paid to beneficiaries based upon the degree
to which they allow themselves to be communicated with. Although this might not be a large sum and its availability is conjectural-it is an incentive that should not be ignored.

226

Gostin, supra note 13, at 457.

227 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1708-09 (arguing for a political disclosure
regime, but identifying major political process barriers).
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Second, many individuals welcome beneficial, tailored
marketing information. This may be particularly so if the information is relevant to a specific need, such as specialized health
care services. Murphy noted a series of privacy
studies
con•
.
228
ducted by Equifax, a credit reporting organization.
He commented on a study concerning consumer perceptions of direct
marketing. When questions were biased toward the harms of
direct solicitation, the majority of responses perceived direct
marketing disfavorably. 229 However, when question bias was
toward the potential benefits of direct marketing, the majority
perceived direct marketing favorably. 230 Murphy validly observes that a minority, in either case, has a strong preference for
privacy, notwithstanding benefits of direct marketing. 231 However, the study directly demonstrates that all individuals do not
unequivocally reject such marketing.
The Healthcare Information Trust, or its expert agents
might also provide other, non-commercial inclusionary benefits
and second-order exclusionary benefits. The Virginia Electronic
Medical Record demonstrates the power of this information to
be used over the Internet. This has the advantage of providing
an immediate, tangible, and demonstrable product to the individual. That is, the individual would have full access to a true
"longitudinal medical record" for her own individual use. Further, to the extent that she uses health care providers from multiple IDSs or has transferred between different MCOs, her full
record would be available to those outside of the particular IDS
or MCO. In addition, she, and her expert agent, would be able
to control the level and content of health care information disclosed. It should again be noted that this information would in
no way replace the clinical and transactional information systems used by individual providers, IDSs, and MCOs; however,
greater access to information in an Internet-based medical record system-particularly where a full longitudinal medical record would not be available across competing IDSs and competing unaligned providers-can substantially benefit care delivery. Some level of this benefit would likely be provided gratuitously, as the Healthcare Information Trust would need such a

228 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2404-07.
229 See id. at 2405.
230 See id. at 2405-06.
23 See id. at 2406.
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real service product immediately to appeal to interested consumers as an incentive to sign the trust agreement.
Ultimately, the initial direct financial and inclusionary
benefits to individuals will likely be dwarfed by the positive
economies of scale created once the Healthcare Information
Trust garners a large population. That is to say, that since the
value of the information product offered to third parties (e.g.,
pharmaceutical companies or governmental agencies), or analysis of health care records (e.g., population IIEDIS measures or
provider proofing) will be in direct relation to the size of the
beneficiary population managed by the Healthcare Information
Trust, a critical mass of beneficiaries will be needed before
Healthcare Information Trust is truly marketable. Therefore, the
cost of initially organizing a critical mass of individual beneficiaries may be a substantial hurdle-if not prohibitive.
The Healthcare Information Trust would best be marketed
through other organizations, such as employers, employer coalitions, and other entities (e.g., American Association of Retired
Persons) representing large pools of health care consumers.
These organizations would be in the best position to understand
and value the second-order exclusionary benefits that such an
organization might offer. For example, in Cleveland, there are
over 350,000 potential beneficiaries in the defunct Cleveland
Health Quality Choice program whose expert purchasers are
still looking for a mechanism to provide these benefits to its
membership. Although this would not eliminate subscription
costs, it might make them manageable. This topic will be discussed further in the next section of this Note.
Considering the competitive and agency problems inherent
in industry collaborations, most acutely demonstrated by the
Cleveland Health Quality Choice experience, it is questionable
whether more than business-to-business integration of medical
health information will ever occur absent some other configuration such as the Healthcare Information Trust. There are, nonetheless, substantial barriers to the creation of a Healthcare Information Trust.
B. The Healthcare Information Trust's Most Substantial
Barriers
There are significant barriers to the Healthcare Information
Trust emerging as a viable entity. This Note will address the
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most challenging. Problems related to initial capitalization, ongoing funding, consumer indifference, and strong resistance by
vested health care industry interests are the most serious.
The Healthcare Information Trust becomes independently
financially viable only when it can achieve a critical mass of
beneficiaries and promote its services in a mature secondary
information market, with organizations willing to purchase access to its data or analysis. In a circular dilemma, a critical mass
of beneficiaries is needed to develop its market; but to be financially viable and able to draw a critical mass of beneficiaries, it
needs a more mature secondary information market in which to
operate. The Healthcare Information Trust, therefore, needs to
be funded in order to create an infrastructure, draw beneficiaries, and develop the secondary health care information market.
This funding could be substantial.
Absent governmental intervention, large health care purchasers, such as self-funded employer groups and employer
purchasing coalitions, must embrace this concept. Ideally,
Medicare and State Medicaid programs would also follow suit,
if the commercially oriented initiatives were successful. Larger
purchasers, despite their own agency conflicts, might even perceive value in the Healthcare Information Trust model and provide seed funding and, most critically, a conduit through which
the Healthcare Information Trust could promote its services directly to individuals. In fact, as the Cleveland Health Quality
Choice experience described in the previous part of this Note
demonstrates, it may be the only way to disgorge information
from MCOs and IDSs without governmental regulatory action.
To maximize the benefit of whole population inclusion,
similar to the HDO concept of "inclusiveness," within Healthcare Information Trusts, 23 2 the government may also play a role
in licensing. Looking to the utility industries as an example, an
individual Healthcare Information Trust might be afforded a
service monopoly over one or several market areas. This would
have the advantage of ensuring one consolidated and uniform
provider of this information within a geographic region, enhancing the value of secondary information reporting and inclusionary and exclusionary benefits to individuals and expert health
care purchasers. Further, it might accelerate the development of
the secondary health care market and provide, through monop232 See INST. OFMED., supra note 17, at 5.
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oly pricing benefit, an enhanced return to beneficiaries and
management company partners.
Consumer indifference may also be a substantial barrier.
The same indifference that leads patients to undervalue their
health care information in provider settings might make it difficult to effectively communicate the benefits of the Healthcare
Information Trust. This might be partially offset by substantive
large-purchaser partnerships with Healthcare Information
Trusts. It may also be partially offset by the inclusionary benefits offered, particularly in early stages prior to the availability
of dividend payments. Such a consumer barrier may make it
expensive to educate populations about the benefits of such an
arrangement and add to the funding needed to form the Healthcare Information Trust.
Since it is likely that a Healthcare Information Trust would
need to be a non-profit organization "owned" by its beneficiaries, direct profit-sharing ownership in the Healthcare Information Trust would be limited. Nonetheless, the for-profit trust
managers may be willing to provide funding, in hopes of longterm fund management contracts and other opportunities (e.g.,
using non-identifiable data for reporting or preferred "marketing arrangements" using the Healthcare Information Trust as
intermediary). IDSs or MCOs, through third party administrators or other subsidiary management companies, might even
realize the Healthcare Information Trust concept is in their own
best long-term interest and offer such partnerships. This might
occur after the Healthcare Information Trust has established a
foothold. These relationships would, of course, be subject to the
Healthcare Information Trust's primary fiduciary obligations to
its beneficiaries.
An empirical analysis of the potential financial market in
which a Healthcare Information Trust operates is outside the
scope of this Note. It is recognized that, absent ongoing governmental subsidies, the feasibility of the Healthcare Information Trust depends upon this determination.
Finally, the resistance of current health care market constituencies to the Healthcare Information Trust cannot be underestimated. Although IDSs and MCOs may present a variety of
barriers to the emergence of Healthcare Information Trusts, including political roadblocks, mere access to electronic medical
records may be the largest single barrier that the Healthcare Information Trust might face.
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Although the HHS regulations mandate individual access to
"copies" of medical information, the regulations do not explicitly contemplate the type of electronic access required by the
Healthcare Information Trust. The final privacy rule leaves such
a transfer open, however. It states that the "covered entity must
provide the individual with access to the protected health information in the form orformat requested by the individual, if it
is readily producible in such form or format; or, if not, in a
readable hard copy form" or as agreed by the covered entity and
the individual.23 3 On the other hand, access only to paper copies
of medical records and claims data would undoubtedly raise the
transaction costs for a Healthcare Information Trust to an unmanageable level. Moreover, access to or transfer of electronic
information in clinical data repositories or data warehouses in
electronic format will require a substantial degree of technical
collaboration between the Healthcare Information Trust and the
target IDSs and MCOs. Even if provided financial compensation for such collaboration, it is not likely that MCOs and IDSs
would work with Healthcare Information Trusts voluntarily.
Moreover, even if MCOs and IDSs provide access to electronic
data, they may well be inclined to frustrate Healthcare Information Trusts by imposing unreasonably "copying" charges, making electronic record transfers financially infeasible.234
The problem of industry reluctance, therefore, may also require some degree of governmental or health purchaser intervention. Judicial precedent giving an individual access to medical records in electronic format may achieve this. More likely,
legislative or regulatory mandates might be required. Achieving
these goals might also require substantial leverage by large
health care purchasers with a vested interest in making the
Healthcare Information Trust a reality. Again, business coalitions, such as Cleveland's Health Action Council, which established the now defunct Cleveland Health Quality Choice, might
be viable partners. Health Action Council's experience may also
233 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(2)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
234 One author tracks the use of copying charges as a means to frustrate access: [Alt Kinko's, a nationally recognized copy business, the charge for copying is
approximately $ .07 per page, which includes the businesses' staff making the copies.
... [A typical] hospital's price per copy....
$ .83 per page .... seems patently unreasonable. Steams, supra note 212, at 80 (discussing the mixed results of case law
interpreting statutes requiring "reasonable" copying charges for medical records).
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suggest that even larger purchasers will not have the leverage to
force this collaboration without governmental intervention.

CONCLUSION
This Note has differentiated between primary and secondary health care information use, recognizing the emerging
value of secondary health care information compiled in healthcare delivery and financing transactions. This Note has also presented IDSs and MCOs as the primary organizers of health care
information and recognized the increasing consolidation of information within clinical data repositories and data warehouses.
Further, it suggests, through a discussion of medical record
economics in light of imminent "privacy default rules," competitive and agency problems in health care, and actual experience of MCOs and IDSs, that existing organizations are not capable of fully exploiting secondary health care information for
the benefit of individuals.
This Note also recognizes that the IHHS FinalStandardsfor
Privacy provide an individual with an affirmative "property"
right in her medical records. Through this property interest an
individual may fully restrict her information from all but excluded or waived secondary uses. The individual might assign
her rights to another entity, however, such as the Healthcare Information Trust.
This Note suggests that a Healthcare Information Trust
could emerge as the expert agent for an individual's secondary
health care information. As an entity with an unfettered fiduciary obligation to maximize the benefit of secondary health care
information for the individual, it would be situated outside of
MCO and IDS competitive and agency limitations. Due to the
Healthcare Information Trust's unique ability to coordinate already consolidated health care information, its virtual monopoly
over secondary use of health care data, its ability to ensure only
limited disclosure of information, and its ability to use secondary health care information for the full range of inclusionary
and second-order exclusionary purposes for the Healthcare In-

formation Trust's beneficiaries, it is a compelling vision. Nonetheless, barriers are apparent. Economic, practical, and political
barriers still need to be fully explored and overcome should the
vision be realized.

